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Abstract 
This dissertation documents pension benefit choices made by public school teachers 
enrolled in the Illinois Teachers’ Retirement System (TRS), where they choose between taking a 
lump-sum withdrawal of their refundable contributions and deferring a pension benefit. The 
analysis explores the extent to which vested teachers enrolled in TRS separate from service with 
positive pension wealth, estimates how much money is “left on the table” at a conventional 
discount rate, and investigates what types of teachers display higher or lower discount rates as 
indicated by cashout patterns. To control for the relative attractiveness between choices, the 
analysis relies on three central measures: the pension-wealth-to-cash-out-ratio, net pension 
wealth, and the internal rate of return.  
Thirty-six percent of classroom teachers in TRS choose to withdraw their refundable 
contributions, and this estimate arguably provides a lower bound for similar “final salary” 
defined benefit pension plans in other states. Results from behavioral models find higher cashout 
rates among male, African American, and Hispanic teachers; teachers who work in rural 
districts; and teachers who did not receive a degree from an elite institution in Illinois. These 
results indicate higher discount rates among these groups. I find no evidence in the data of a 
relationship between subject endorsements and cashout decisions. Behavioral findings are 
consistent across models that assume different discount rates. 
 The analysis concludes with an estimate of the aggregate leakage that occurs among TRS 
members who take a refund claim. Leakage is defined as NetPW for refund claimants who quit 
when the value of their pension wealth outweighs their refundable contributions. Leakage that 
refund claimants experience since 1980, adjusted for taxes and penalties, amount to $34,120 per 
refund claimant among all members and $35,229 per refund claimant among classroom teachers. 
Over four-fifths of this leakage, however, occurred since 2000. Annuitants incur about $9,000 
per member. Relative to the overall fiscal health of TRS, total leakage by members since 1980 as 
a percentage of pension debt is 0.2 percent. The findings in this analysis suggest a set of policy 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
Over 3.3 million K-12 public school teachers nationwide (Snyder & Dillow, 2012) 
comprise the largest proportion of covered workers in state pension plans, with 88 percent of all 
teachers enrolling in defined benefit (DB) retirement plans (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2013). 
These systems impose large capital losses on young and mobile teachers who leave a system 
before reaching retirement eligibility (Costrell & Podgursky, 2010). Less understood, however, 
is the extent that teachers cash out of their pension plans even though they may be eligible for a 
deferred retirement benefit payable for life and the extent of leakage that occurs as a result of 
these decisions. Because 92 percent of teacher-covered public pension plans exclude employer 
contributions from refund distributions,
1,2
 important questions pertain to the extent that teachers 
make decisions impacting their retirement security and whether current systems are equitable and 
fair for teachers. Moreover, the choices directly observed in the data may be indicative of how 
much teachers value their retirement benefits. That is, the data may reveal teachers’ preferences 
for deferred compensation over up-front compensation and vice-versa. 
                                                          
1
 Teachers in Alaska, Colorado, Iowa, Michigan, Ohio, Oregon, South Dakota, and Utah may 
receive some portion of their employer contributions. Colorado, Iowa and South Dakota are the 
only plans with “final salary” defined benefit plans that credit a portion of employer 
contributions to refunds. The other five states offer a defined contribution plan, a hybrid plan, or 
some set of plan choices, and employer contributions in these cases are specifically earmarked 
for individual retirement accounts associated with the defined contribution portion of the plans. 
Notably, vested teachers in Arizona could collect a portion of the employer contributions before 
July 1, 2011. The state eliminated this provision for new teachers hired on or after this date. 
2
  Employer and employee contributions fund public defined benefit pension plans. Typically, 
but not always, employee contributions are set at a fixed rate while employer contributions are 
actuarially determined on an annual basis. Combined, the employer and employee contributions 
are sufficient to cover the normal costs of a pension plan and amortize a plan’s unfunded 
liabilities (assuming the fund meets its assumed investment rate and other assumptions about 
plan experience). By cashing out, an employee gives up all rights to any future pension payments 
that she accrued up to the point of separation. In this event, granting an employee only her 
portion of the contributions provides one way to keep the plan’s costs down. If a plan credits 
employer costs to refunds as well, then contributions to the pension fund (the employer portion, 
the employee portion, or both) will also need to increase in order to adequately fund the plan. 
2 
 
Some studies have taken unique approaches to examine how much teachers value their 
retirement benefits. Fitzpatrick (2012) exploits a policy change in Illinois that allowed teachers 
to upgrade their benefits from service accrued prior to 1998 to estimate the value that Illinois 
public school teachers place on deferred compensation by comparing the cost for this upgrade 
with teachers’ willingness to pay for this enhancement. She estimates that, on average, teachers 
are willing to pay 19 cents on the dollar for this benefit. Goldhaber and Grout (2014a), on the 
other hand, find that teachers in Washington are generally willing to contribute a higher portion 
of earnings to the defined contribution portion of the hybrid plan than the minimum level of five 
percent. Their lower-bound estimate of the average marginal value of one dollar of retirement 
investment by teachers is over fifty cents, larger than Fitzpatrick’s estimate. 
Aldeman and Rotherham (2014) use state annual financial reports to estimate the 
proportion of teachers in each state who remain in the system long enough to start receiving a 
retirement benefit. Only 44.5 percent of teachers in the median state, for instance, will stay in 
their retirement system long enough to qualify for a deferred retirement benefit while only 19.7 
percent  in the median state reach normal retirement eligibility. Thus, despite the magnitude of 
resources that states allocate to deferred compensation,
3
 the majority of teachers choose not to 
remain in a system long enough to even qualify for a minimum benefit, and substantially fewer 
will work long enough in one system to qualify for normal retirement benefits, which can 
potentially reach several hundred thousand dollars in pension wealth.
4
 
                                                          
3
 By their own measures, state teacher-covered retirement systems plus the District of Columbia 
owe about $1.9 trillion in retirement benefits. This figure excludes liabilities facing local pension 
plans, such as Chicago and Saint Louis, which operate independently of state systems. 
4
 Pension wealth is the present discounted value of the stream of annuity payments a retiree 
receives from the first day of retirement for the rest of his or her life. 
3 
 
Public employees in so-called “final average salary” defined benefit (FAS DB) plans
5
 
who separate from service before reaching retirement eligibility typically face a choice between 
deferring a pension, payable once she reaches pension eligibility, and a lump sum distribution of 
her refundable contributions. The value of the tradeoffs between collecting a pension and 
foregoing this lifetime benefit is less known, however. While a body of research examines cash-
out decisions, few studies have examined distribution choice in public pension plans, and none 
have systematically examined K-12 public school teachers’ decisions. This paper addresses this 
research gap by examining refund-related choices by K-12 public school teachers in the Illinois 
Teachers’ Retirement System (TRS). 
Important differences between private and public FAS DB pension plans affect 
refund/annuity decisions and warrant an examination of plans in both sectors. The Pension 
Protection Act of 2006 governs methods for computing the value of lump sum benefits under 
FAS DB plans in the private sector. A lump sum distribution must equal the present value of the 
annuity benefit, and the Internal Revenue Code specifies the interest rate and mortality tables 
required for computing the minimum amount for a refund (Purcell, 2007).
6
 In the public sector, 
on the other hand, methods for determining lump sum distributions are not regulated and are 
largely based on the value of contributions rather than annuities. Figure 1 gives the distribution 
of refund types for teacher-covered public pension plans and shows that the value of refunds 
ranges from less than a teachers’ overall contributions to an amount that includes both member 
                                                          
5
 These plans are sometimes also referred to as traditional DB plans. The value of a benefit under 
this plan depends on some average of her salary, an accrual factor, and creditable service. 
6
 Changes to the law enacted in 2008 required plans to use new mortality tables and interest 
rates. Changes in mortality assumptions, reflecting increases in life expectancy, alone increased 
the value of lump sum refunds by 1 percent to 2 percent. Assumptions about the interest rate 
shifted from rates based on 30-year U.S. Treasury bonds to rates based on corporate bonds. 
Corporate bonds tend to be higher than U.S. Treasury bonds and, therefore, will tend to reduce 
the refund benefit. 
4 
 
and employer contributions. Of 50 teacher-covered state retirement plans plus the District of 
Columbia, 47 plans exclude employer contributions for funding FAS DB plans from refund 
credits. Teachers vested in TRS who retire before reaching retirement-eligibility choose between 
a lump sum withdrawal (LSW) and a deferred lifetime annuity. Illinois provides an interesting 
case because, like most states, teachers enroll in a FAS DB plan, and those who opt to receive a 
LSW do not collect the employer’s portion of contributions to the pension fund.
7
 In addition, 
Illinois does not subscribe to Social Security, thus removing a source of endogeneity inherent in 
retirement decisions.
8
  Unlike most states, however, teachers collect less than their cumulative 
contributions. TRS members do not receive contributions earmarked for survivor benefits, equal 
to one percent of earnings. Moreover, Illinois does not credit interest on teachers’ refundable 
contributions. Thus, refund claimants receive significantly less than if they initially did not 
contribute anything to TRS and instead put their money in a savings account. Finally, while 
public FAS DB plans like Illinois’s vary across states, the general structure and behavior of these 
plans are very similar. Thus, results from an analysis on one state will arguably generalize to a 
much wider set of systems. Because refund rules in Illinois are less favorable for teachers than 
any other state, the rate of withdrawals in Illinois likely set a lower bound estimate for potential 
cashout rates in other states.  
                                                          
7
 Teachers contribute 9.4 percent of their earnings while the employer rate (paid by the state) is 
35.41 percent for FY 2014. The employer rates for the prior two fiscal years were 24.91 percent 
and 28.05 percent in FY 2012 and FY 2013, respectively (Teachers Retirement System of the 
State of Illinois: Contribution Rates, 
http://trs.illinois.gov/employers/payments/contributions.htm, accessed 4/16/2014). 
8
 The propensity for individuals or households to cash out is increasing in retirement income, 
such as from secondary sources like Social Security. Adding Social Security as an additional 
source of retirement income for Illinois teachers, for instance, might increase teachers’ sense of 
security about their retirement. In turn, they may perceive greater freedom to cash out and direct 
how they invest their refunds. The state, on the other hand, might adjust retirement benefits by an 
amount equal to what teachers might receive by joining Social Security. 
5 
 
Figure 1: Type of refund disbursements for K-12 public school teachers (all state teacher-
covered retirement systems plus the District of Columbia) 
 
Less than own: Illinois and Kentucky 
Own, without interest: District of Columbia, Florida, Louisiana, Oregon, and Rhode Island 
Own, with interest: Alabama,  Arizona,  Arkansas,  California,  Connecticut,  Delaware,  
Georgia,  Hawaii,  Idaho,  Indiana,  Kansas,  Maine,  Maryland,  Massachusetts,  Michigan,  
Minnesota,  Mississippi,  Missouri,  Montana,  Nebraska,  Nevada,  New Hampshire,  New 
Jersey,  New Mexico,  New York,  North Carolina,  North Dakota,  Ohio,  Oklahoma,  
Pennsylvania,  South Carolina,  Tennessee,  Texas,  Utah,  Vermont,  Virginia,  Washington,  
West Virginia,  Wisconsin, and Wyoming 
Own plus at least a portion of employer contributions: Colorado, Iowa, and South Dakota 
Omitted: Alaska, which does not offer a defined benefit component in its pension plan 







Figure 2: Pension wealth and lump sum refund accrual for female teacher in Illinois TRS 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Tier I rules; the interest rate for refundable contributions 





I illustrate the choice to take a refund or defer an annuity for a representative Tier 1 
teacher in Figure 2, which depicts the year-over-year cumulative pension wealth (solid line) and 
lump sum refund (dashed line) patterns for a female teacher in Illinois who enters service at age 
25.
9
 Initially, this teacher’s refund exceeds her expected pension wealth (PW), which is zero 
until she vests after 5 years of service (YOS). At 9 YOS, she reaches a crossover point (marked 
by the vertical dashed line) where PW surpasses the value of her refund benefit. Because defined 
benefit plans are “back-loaded,” the rate that the gap widens quite rapidly increases until she 
reaches age eligibility for a pension. This gap exceeds $100,000 in her mid-40’s and continues to 
grow thereafter until PW reaches its peak. I refer to this gap as net pension wealth, denoted 
NetPW and discussed in detail in Chapter 3, throughout this paper. It is simply the difference 
between pension wealth and lump sum refund evaluated at the same point in time. 
Of Illinois classroom teachers identified as refund claimants in the data, 24 percent exit 
with positive pension wealth (i.e. they separate after the crossover point). After accounting for 
taxes and penalties associated with non-rollovers and early withdrawal, 35 percent of refund 
claimants quit with positive NetPW. This group is the focus of my analysis. Table 1 presents the 
distribution of NetPW for refund claimants and reports rates based on unadjusted and adjusted 
values of pension wealth. Zero NetPW indicates the crossover point.
10
 About 41 percent of 
                                                          
9
 The entry age assumption is close to the average entry age of 27 observed among refund 
claimants and inactive members in the Illinois data. Figure 2 assumes earnings according to the 
Springfield Public School District’s salary schedule, 2.5 percent inflation, 4 percent real rate of 
return, and survival probabilities from the Center for Disease Control’s Life Tables (Arias, 2007). 
This rate is comparable to interest rates assumed in other recent analyses. For instance, Coile and 
Gruber (2007) assume a 6 percent real rate of return while Koedel, Ni and Podgursky (2014) 
assume a 4 percent real rate. The median nominal rate assumed by state-based teacher-covered 
pension plans is 7.75 percent, or 125 basis points higher than the figure’s assumption. 
10
 The crossover point is sensitive to assumptions about the real rate of return and can have a 
significant impact on the proportion of teachers observed before and after this point. For 
instance, the share of teachers who separate after the crossover point is 78 percent under a 2 
8 
 
refund claimants who separate after the crossover point leave with less than $10,000 in NetPW 
while 20 percent leave with between $10,000 and $20,000 in NetPW. Thirty-nine percent 
separate with NetPW that exceeds $20,000. This group of refund claimants lends itself to the 
“annuity puzzle” and motivates the analysis at hand. I explore two questions: 
1. To what extent do vested teachers enrolled in TRS separate from service with positive net 
pension wealth, and how much money is “left on the table” at a conventional discount 
rate? 
2. As indicated by cashout patterns, what types of teachers display higher or lower discount 
rates? 
Table 1: Distribution of net pension wealth for TRS classroom teacher refund claimants 
  Unadjusted Adjusted 
Net pension wealth number percent number percent 
Less than $0 4,067 76.0% 3478 65.0% 
$0 to $10,000 530 9.9% 826 15.4% 
$10,000 to $20,000 259 4.8% 375 7.0% 
$20,000 to $30,000 151 2.8% 205 3.8% 
$30,000 to $40,000 102 1.9% 152 2.8% 
$40,000 to $50,000 68 1.3% 90 1.7% 
More than $50,000 175 3.3% 226 4.2% 
Notes: NetPW values are reported in 2011 dollars and based on 4 percent real interest, 2.5 
percent inflation, and gender- and race-specific survival probabilities from the CDC's 2007 
Life Tables; statistics are based on a sample that includes all classroom teachers hired in or 
after 1980, all separation ages, and individuals who vested in the system; it excludes teachers 
who left TRS and continued work in another Illinois reciprocal retirement system. 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
percent real interest rate and 10 percent by assuming 6 percent interest. Table A.1 in Appendix A 
reports rates based on 2 and 6 percent discount rates. 
9 
 
Types of Pension Plans 
Defined benefit plans 
Pension plans fall into three categories: defined benefit, defined contribution, and cash 
balance plans. Traditional defined benefit plans, sometimes called “final average salary” defined 
benefit (FAS DB) plans, calculate a member’s benefit as a function of years of service, an 
average of the highest salary of some number of years, and an accrual factor (or multiplier).  
Under FAS DB plans, a teacher must first vest in the system by working a minimum number of 
years in order to be eligible for a retirement benefit. 
An individual teacher’s retirement benefit is defined by the formula 
Benefiti = π * YOSi * FASi     (i) 
where π is an accrual rate, YOS is the number of creditable years of service, and FAS is the 
average salary in the final few years of her career. The product of π and YOS is commonly 
referred to as the replacement rate and represents the percent of one’s pre-retirement income she 
receives after retirement.
11
 For example, the annuity for a teacher who retires after 25 years of 
service, exits with a FAS of $60,000, and works in a state that provides 2.5 percent of her FAS 
per year is 
(0.025 per year) x ($60,000) x (25 years) = $37,500 per year 
payable for life starting at her eligible retirement age. Many states add a cost-of-living 
adjustment on top of this base benefit. 
                                                          
11
 Some public retirement plans place a cap on the replacement rate. Members of the Illinois 




FAS DB plans do not allow portability like other types of retirement plans. That is, 
teachers typically cannot take both their member and employer contributions when they separate 
service. Moreover, few public plans allow their teachers to collect the employer’s contributions 
if they cash out rather than defer a pension until retirement eligibility. While these features 
significantly disadvantage teachers who do not remain in a single retirement system until 
retirement eligibility, other types of plans such as defined contribution (DC) or cash balance 
(CB) plans offer more favorable features for these types of workers. Moreover, such plans are 
more transparent in that they tie benefits to contributions (Costrell & Podgursky, 2011). 
FAS DB plans create political incentives that lead to substantial underfunding (McGee, 
no date). Despite every state constitution except Vermont’s including some form of balanced 
budget requirement (Poterba, 1995), states are carrying substantial magnitudes of pension debt 
(a.k.a. unfunded liabilities, or the amount owed in benefits in excess of the assets on hand for 
payments.
12
 Constitutional balanced budget requirements place states like California and Illinois 
with large fiscal imbalances in the unenviable position of making difficult financial choices, 
namely reducing retirement benefits, raising state and local property taxes, or cutting funding for 
public services.  Moreover, although many state constitutions guarantee pension promises to 
public employees,
13
 there are no guarantees in place for politicians to adequately fund pensions 
                                                          
12
 Estimates of unfunded liabilities for the nation’s public pension plans range from $1.38 trillion 
(Pew Center on the States, 2012) to $4.43 trillion (Novy-Marx & Rauh, 2011).  To put these 
estimates in perspective, the pension debt ranges from about $10,000 to $33,000 per U.S. 
household. By their own calculations, teacher-covered state-based pension plans alone face 
$532.5 billion in pension debt, excluding retiree health insurance.  
13
 Pension reforms commonly target reductions in COLAs, increases in the retirement age or 
vesting requirements, raises in contribution rates, or establishing a defined contribution, hybrid, 
or cash balance plan. Lawsuits usually follow in almost every case. The most common claim is 
that pension reforms violate the Contracts Clause either in the U.S. Constitution or state 
constitution. Snell (2012) provides a summary of pension enactments around the country that 
11 
 
so that future promises can be met. That is, these rules do not prohibit states from making 
promises for future expenditures without commensurate allocations to pension funds. Such 
structural problems are a significant reason why most private sector firms moved away from 
FAS DB plans in favor of adopting defined contribution and cash balance plans. 
Defined contribution plans 
Under a defined contribution (DC) plan, a worker’s retirement benefit depends on 
contributions into a retirement account and investment performance. Thus, whereas a FAS DB 
plan defines the level of retirement benefit, a DC plan defines the contributions made to a 
retirement account. Although there is variation across plans in how contributions are determined, 
employees usually contribute some percent of her earnings periodically into her account, and the 
employer typically matches this amount (usually up to a certain amount). Therefore, while 
employers (i.e. taxpayers) who fund FAS DB plans tend to incur most of the financial risk 
related to investment performance by the pension fund,
14
 employees tend to incur most financial 
risk under DC plans because their benefits rely on investment performance. Employers make 
contributions under the plan’s rules, which are independent of realized gains or losses. 
Employees usually have some measure of control over how their savings accounts are invested, 
and these accounts are portable for workers who leave a retirement system. Once an employee 
retires, her retirement benefit is based on the balance in her account. At retirement, an employee 
usually has the choice to take a withdrawal of her account as a lump sum or annuitize all or part 
of her retirement savings. Workers who rely on DC plans for retirement income and do not 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
occurred in 2012 while Buck (2013) provides an excellent overview of pension litigation in the 
U.S.  
14
 Workers enrolled in DB plans also face financial risk in the form of not receiving a pension in 
the event the system becomes insolvent. 
12 
 




Cash balance plans 
By definition, cash balance (CB) plans comprise a subset of DB plans. They provide a 
revenue-neutral alternative to FAS DB plans that do not penalize worker mobility by combining 
components from FAS DB and DC plans.
16
 For instance, by virtue of guaranteeing a fixed rate of 
return, they guarantee some level of retirement for employees, like a FAS DB plan, while 
offering the portability of a DC plan. Benefits are tied to contributions and are based on an 
employee’s notional (or “hypothetical”) account. An employee periodically receives a benefit 
credit and an interest credit. A unit of service earns a fixed benefit credit applied to the 
employee’s account and is independent of investment experience. The interest credit is 
commonly fixed to an index such as U.S. Treasury bills (Elliott & Moore, 2000). Thus, a 
worker’s account is built up in a smooth-accruing manner over the course of her career. 
Individual accounts are hypothetical and not administered at an individual level. Rather, assets 
are pooled into a single fund, as with FAS DB plans, and managed by the fund’s trustees. 
Typically, when a worker separates, she can convert her account into an annuity or take a lump 
sum distribution, as under a DC plan. The different characteristics across these retirement plans 




                                                          
15
 An employee who separates from a DB plan and takes a lump sum withdrawal of her 
refundable contributions without annuitizing also faces the risk of outliving her refund. 
16
 For this reason, CB plans are sometimes referred to as “hybrid” plans. 
13 
 
Shaping the workforce 
From a labor market perspective, pensions provide tools for shaping the composition of a 
workforce and, by extension, the productivity of a firm or industry. Pension plans may offer 
incentives for workers with certain traits to take up employment with a firm, thus affecting the 
composition of the workforce along different dimensions (such as quality, risk preferences, 
discount rates, and propensity for changing jobs). Ippolito (1997) compares worker quit rates 
between federal and private employees and demonstrates that FAS DB plans offer effective 
instruments for incentivizing long-tenure among workers. Clark and Scheiber (2004) discuss 
how certain types of firms and workers in the private sector favor certain types of pensions. 
Firms and employees characterized by “firm-specific human capital” tend to favor FAS DB 
plans.17   Many firms and industries, however, have shifted to using “general human capital” and 
are characterized by low-cost training and high-turnover.18 These types of firms and employees 
would prefer DC and CB pensions because they do not penalize mobile workers as FAS DB 
plans do (Costrell & Podgursky, 2010). Retirement plans may also differentially affect turnover 
over different points in a career. Asch, Haider, and Zissimopoulos (2005), for instance, use data 
on federal workers covered by the Civil Service Retirement System to examine the role of 
financial incentives on retirement behavior. They find that workers time their retirements 
according to where it is financially optimal to do so. 
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 For example, some companies might use very specialized equipment that requires intensive 
(and costly) training for its employees to operate. These firms prefer low-turnover among its 
employees, and its employees prefer to stay with the company long-term because their 
specialized skills may not transfer easily to other firms or industries. 
18
 Secretaries offer one example: a person who learns to type, operate a computer, and develop 
organizational skills can readily apply this set of skills across different firms and industries. 
14 
 
Throughout the 1970’s, FAS DB plans were the most common type offered to workers in 
both the public and private sectors. During the 1980’s and 1990’s, however, most of the private 
sector closed their FAS DB plans in favor of opening DC and CB ones (Munnell, 2006) while 
total retirement coverage has stagnated (Munnell & Perun, 2006). Today, stark differences exist 
in retirement plan participation between public and private sector workers. 
 
Participation in pension plans 
 Table 2 summarizes plan participation between private and public employees. Each panel 
provides access, participation, and take-up rates for all retirement plans, FAS DB-only plans, and 
DC-only plans. These categorical rates are defined as the percent of all workers with access to a 
plan, the percent of all workers who enroll in a plan, and the percent of workers who enroll in a 
plan conditional on having access, respectively. In general, public workers are more likely to 
have access to retirement plans than all private sector workers (89 percent versus 65 percent), 
and those with access are significantly more likely to participate (95 percent versus 75 percent). 
Higher access rates may be partially explained by the notion that politicians face greater political 
risk from raising pay than from increasing benefits because the latter is more opaque (Glaeser & 
Ponzetto, 2013). Furthermore, disconnect exists between politicians who enhance benefits and 
consequences linked to their actions. While today’s politicians might enhance retirement benefits 
to gain favor with special interest groups such as teacher unions, future politicians will be stuck 
with raising revenue to foot the bills (Moe, 2011). The higher take-up rates observed in the 
public sector may be a reflection of union presence and automatic enrollment by most public 
15 
 
employees. Employees that do not automatically enroll may receive better information or 
stronger encouragement from unions to enroll. 
Union influence on retirement access and enrollment is indicative by the jumps in access 
and take-up rates for private union workers. Union membership appears to increase access to 
FAS DB plans –69 percent of private-sector union workers have access to FAS DB plans, 
compared to just 14 percent for non-union private-sector workers. Nearly all public union 
workers have access to FAS DB plans, 22 percentage points more than public non-union 
workers.  
Private-sector workers have greater access to DC plans than public workers – 59 percent 
compared to 31 percent, respectively. The take-up rates for DC plans are also higher for private-
sector employees. Access was slightly higher for private non-union workers and about the same 
for public union and non-union workers. Take-up rates were higher for public non-union 
employees than union members, possibly reflecting a preference by union members for FAS DB 
plans over DC plans or differences in information obtained about retirement options between the 
two groups. 
Although the BLS compiles information about public elementary, secondary, and special 
education teachers, it does not provide data on this group of workers in the private sector 
explicitly. It includes a category for private-sector management, professional, and related 
workers, which includes education occupations. Access to retirement is nearly universal for 
public school teachers, compared to 79 percent for their private-sector counterparts. About 95 
percent of all public school teachers participate in FAS DB plans while only 24 percent of 
similar private workers participate.  While only 24 percent of public school teachers have access 
16 
 
to DC plans, only 7 percent participate. Their private-sector counterparts, on the other hand, are 
substantially more likely to have access and participate. I now discuss the pension system for 






Table 2: Access, take-up, and participation rates for retirement plans by private and public sector employees, 2012 
  all retirement plans DB DC 
  access take-up 
participatio
n access take-up 
participatio




         private (all) 65% 75% 48% 19% 89% 17% 59% 70% 41% 
private (> 500 employees) 86% 88% 76% 46% 92% 42% 78% 78% 61% 
public 89% 95% 84% 83% 94% 78% 31% 48% 15% 
Union 
         private 92% 92% 85% 69% 96% 66% 57% 78% 45% 
public 97% 95% 92% 95% 94% 89% 31% 36% 11% 
Non-union 
         private 62% 72% 45% 14% 85% 12% 60% 69% 41% 
public 83% 95% 78% 73% 94% 68% 31% 58% 18% 
Profession 
         private (mgt., prof., and related) 79% 86% 68% 26% 90% 24% 76% 81% 61% 
public (primary, secondary, and sped 
teachers) 99% 97% 96% 98% 97% 95% 24% 30% 7% 
Source: BLS, National Compensation Survey - Benefits Database, http://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/ 
NOTES: access rates and participation rates indicate the percentage of all workers in each group who have access to and 
participate in a retirement plan. Take-up rates indicate the percentage of workers with access who choose to participate. 





The Illinois Teachers’ Retirement System 
The Illinois Teachers’ Retirement System (TRS) is a publicly funded defined benefit plan 
for public school employees and one of several retirement systems in Illinois that cover state and 
local public employees.
19
 In 2010 Illinois lawmakers enacted Senate Bill 1946, dramatically 
changing the parameters of its public retirement systems while keeping the FAS DB structure 
intact.
20
 Many lawmakers perceived Illinois’s fiscal situation as so drastic that Senate Bill 1946 
“raced through the General Assembly in a matter of hours” in March 2010 (Finke, 2010). As a 
result, a two-tier system was created. Table 3 summarizes the plan provisions for Tier 1 and Tier 
2 members. New employees starting on or after January 1, 2011 enrolled in the new plan (Tier 2) 
while employees who started before enrolled under the original retirement plan (Tier 1). The 
differences between the two plans are remarkable. 
Tier 2 significantly reduces retirement benefits for employees by doubling the vesting 
requirement to 10 YOS and number of years for computing the FAS to 8 years. The COLA is 
tied to an inflation index and is not compounded (versus 3 percent annual and compounded 
under Tier 1). The age required to receive full benefits increases to 67, while a teacher with 10 
YOS can retire at age 62 at a 6 percent annual discounted rate. It is no longer possible for 
                                                          
19
 Teachers in Chicago Public Schools enroll in a separate system, the Chicago Teachers’ 
Pension Fund (CTPF). Parameters for determining teacher benefits under CTPF and TRS are 
similar. Notably, charter schools are required to join TRS. Certified teachers in Chicago must 
join CTPF while non-certified teachers are exempt from this requirement (Olberg & Podgursky, 
2011). Consequently, charter schools must make statutory contributions, which are actuarially 
determined on an annual basis. This requirement arguably makes financial planning more 
difficult given the uncertainty about future contribution requirements. 
20
 In December 2013, the General Assembly enacted another law to its pension plans that applies 
to all active, inactive, and retired Tier 1 members. Tier 2 members are not affected. Lawsuits 
were subsequently filed, and Illinois courts are currently deliberating on the constitutionality of 
the new law. If upheld, provisions will include diminishing COLA adjustments for current 
retirees, imposing a cap on earnings, and reducing the contribution rate from 9.4 percent to 8.4 




teachers to retire in their 50’s and receive a benefit. The FAS calculation now includes a cap on 
salary at $106,800 for new members, but this limit will more likely affect administrators rather 
than teachers. 
Table 3: Provisions for 2010 Pension Reform in Illinois Public Act 96-0889 
  Tier I Tier II 
Member Eligibility 
Members who contributed prior to 
January 1, 2011 
Members who contributed on or 
after January 1, 2011 
Vesting years 5 YOS 10 YOS 
Member 
contributions 
9.0 percent of creditable earnings 
between 7/1/1998 and 7/1/2005; 
9.4 percent of creditable earnings 
beginning 7/1/2005 
9.4 percent of creditable earnings 
Retirement 
Eligibility 
- age 55 w/ 35 YOS if employee 
chose to have pension determined 
by 2.2 percent formula and paid a 
fee; 
- age 67 to receive full benefits; 
- age 55 w/ 20 YOS, benefit 
reduced by 6 percent each year 
member under age 60; 
- age 62 w/ 10 YOS, benefits 
reduced by 6 percent for each year 
under age 67 
- age 60 w/ 10 YOS   
- age 62 w/ 5 YOS   
FAS 
highest average salary during 4 
consecutive years out of last 10 
YOS 
highest average salary during 8 
consecutive of last 10 YOS 
Cap 
benefits capped once, 75 percent of 
FAS 
capped in two ways: 
1) max benefit is 75 percent FAS; 
2) in FAS calc, no salary will 
exceed a limit tied to CPI 
(currently $106,800 as of 2010) 
COLA 3 percent compounded annually 
adjustments based on less of 3 




Currently, cap on service is 120 
days (600 hours); 
Retirement benefits suspended if 
member works full-time in other 
pension that has reciprocal rights 
with TRS 
from July 1, 2011 cap reduced to 
100 days (500 hours) 
Table based on information from: EZ Guide to Tier I and Tier II Retirement under Public Act 96-




The current funding position of the system cannot guarantee that future pension 
obligations will be met. Years of “pension holidays” from meeting its fiscal obligations, coupled 
with benefit enhancements without commensurate increases in funding over the evolution of the 
plan, puts the system at risk of not being able to meet its obligations in the future. By its own 
measures, TRS assets currently cover 41 cents for every dollar of benefit owed (TRS, 2014). By 
far, the largest portion of Illinois’s public pension debt derives from obligations to TRS 
members.  
 
Benefit Distribution Choice 
Vested TRS members who separate from service prior to attaining retirement eligibility 
face a choice to take a refund of their contributions or defer collecting a lifetime pension starting 
at a later date. This choice is common in public sector FAS DB plans. Teachers who do not file 
for a refund claim leave their contributions in the pension fund and collect an annuity upon 
reaching retirement eligibility. Teachers must also file a form before they can start collecting an 
annuity. If they do not file a claim, then they receive nothing until age 70-½, when Federal law 




For Tier 1 members, a refund withdrawal amounts to 7 percent of creditable earnings 
earned up to June 30, 1998; 8 percent of creditable earnings earned between June 30, 1998 and 
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 This practice is similar to North Carolina’s, where the default choice is receiving no benefit. 
Public workers must file a claim to receive either a lump sum refund or an annuity. Workers do 





June 30, 2005; and 8.4 percent of creditable earnings earned thereafter.
22
 Unlike many FAS DB 
plans in other states, refund claimants under IL TRS do not receive any interest accrued from 
their contributions.
23
 Once a refund claim is processed, a member foregoes any claim to a 
deferred annuity. Members who do not vest in the system may not collect an annuity at any point 
later in their life. Members with fewer than five years of creditable service, however, have a 
choice between two different lump sum disbursements. The first is a conventional refund of their 
contributions (without interest). Alternatively, she may receive a “Single Sum Retirement” 
benefit. Under this option, a member may receive a lump sum disbursement actuarially 
equivalent to an annuity starting at age 65 based on the formula 0.0167x(FAS)x(YOS).
24
 
Refund claimants forego one percent of their contributions earmarked for survivor 
benefits.
25
 Once a teacher cashes out, anyone they designate as a beneficiary becomes ineligible 
for survivor benefits; yet, refund claimants do not regain the one percent of earnings from their 
contributions that is designated for survivor benefits. Moreover, a claimant’s distribution may be 
subject to additional taxes or penalties depending on whether they roll over their benefit into a 
tax-sheltered retirement account. If a member’s refund can be rolled over into another retirement 
account and the claimant elects to take a cash distribution, then TRS will withhold 20 percent of 
the refund amount, as required by law (TRS, 2013b).
26
 Withdrawing before age 59-½ without 
rolling over her refunds may subject an individual to an additional 10 percent early withdrawal 
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 Starting July 1, 2005, refunds for members who do not retire under the Early Retirement 
Option includes an additional 0.4 percent of creditable earnings, thus boosting the rate on 
creditable earnings to 8.4 percent. 
23
 Of 47 states that refund only member contributions, 40 states credit teachers’ contributions 
with interest credit, either at a fixed rate or a fair market rate. 
24
 About 0.49 percent of TRS members hired since FY 1980 avail themselves of a Single-Sum 
Retirement benefit. 
25
 The survivor benefits program was enacted in 1959 (TRS, 2013a).  
26
 Participants in private 401(k) plans who cash out are also subject to a 20 percent employer 




penalty. Thus, refund claimants face potential short-term and long-term costs associated with 
cashing out: 1) costs associated with early withdrawals, and 2) costs later in life associated with 
lower levels of retirement savings and foregone accumulation of compounding interest. 
About 30 percent of all TRS members and 33 percent of classroom teachers arranged for 
TRS to roll over at least a portion of their distribution to a retirement account. While it is 
possible that members deposit their refunds in a retirement account themselves, research finds 
that people tend to be much less pro-active in retirement decisions. Thus, it is likely that roughly 
70 percent of refund claimants had their distributions reduced by the tax penalty. This rate is 
lower than findings from Clark, Morrill, and Vanderweide (2013), who state that over 90 percent 
of all public workers in North Carolina who opt for a lump sum distribution take their refund as 
cash rather than rolling it over into a retirement account. 
An analysis of benefit choice that examines teachers exclusively is especially warranted 
given that teachers tend to be highly mobile and separate a system at young ages and/or with low 
YOS.
27
 FAS DB plans by design disadvantage these groups in favor of veteran, full-career 
teachers, though only a small proportion of teachers remain in one system for a full career. 
Illinois is no exception. Consider Figure 3, which pictorially depicts the separation rates for all 
TRS members by age by YOS. Table 4 complements the figure, providing separation rates for 
age and YOS bins. Notably, over three-quarters of observed separations occur prior to vesting.
28
 
Half of all separations occur before a member vests in the system (less than 5 YOS) and before 
age 40 (mid-career for many workers). On the other hand, only 17 percent of these exits occur at 
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 Analyses that illustrate high teacher turnover within the context of retirement include McGee 
and Winters (2013) and Aldeman and Rotherham (2014), where they show that separations are 
heavily skewed towards teachers with low years of service. 
28
 This rate is about 9 percentage points higher than the 68 percent reported by Aldeman and 




age 55 or later. Furthermore, separations from age 55 by members who have accrued at least 20 
YOS (requirements for qualifying for a reduced early retirement benefit) comprise only 6 percent 
of separations.
29
 Thus, despite enrolling in a plan that heavily favors longevity within the system, 
only a very small proportion of members stay long enough to qualify for full or reduced pension 
benefits. 
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 Early retirement benefits are discounted 6 percent per year under age 60. Members with 35 




Figure 3: Separations from TRS by age by YOS, 1980-2011 
 
NOTES to Figure 3: I define a separation as a member who retires, takes a full refund, takes a 
Single-Sum refund, or is classified as inactive. This sample consists of 170,447 members and 
includes separations during 1980-2011 and between ages 20 and 70 by all TRS members hired 
from 1980.  It excludes Tier 2 and deceased members and inactive members observed moving to 
a reciprocal retirement system in Illinois. A teacher must be absent from the system for one full 





Table 4: TRS separation rates by age by YOS 
  Separation age   
  20-25 25-30 30-35 35-40 40-45 45-50 50-55 55-60 60-65 65-70 Total 
YOS 
          
  
0-5 0.13 0.21 0.10 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.77 
5-10 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 
10-15 . . 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.04 
15-20 . . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 
20-25 . . . . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.03 
25-30 . . . . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 
30-35 . . . . . . 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 
35-40 . . . . . . . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
40-45 . . . . . . . . 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Total 0.13 0.23 0.14 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.02 1.00 
Notes: Table is based on a sample (n=170,447) that includes all TRS members (including non-
teachers) who were hired on or after 1980, separated by 2011, and left between ages 20 and 70; 
sample excludes Tier 2, deceased members, and individuals who left TRS and re-entered 
service in a reciprocal Illinois retirement system; I define a separation as a member who 
retired, took a full refund, took a Single-sum refund (applicable to non-vested members), or 
who TRS identifies as inactive. A teacher must be absent from the system for one full year 




This dissertation is divided into five chapters. In Chapter 2, I review the literature on 
teacher pensions, discuss the annuity puzzle, and review the general literature that pertains to 
benefit distribution choice. In Chapter 3, I discuss the data and methods used to analyze teachers’ 
choices between cashing out and deferring a lifetime annuity. The chapter includes summary 
statistics. Chapter 4 discusses the results of the behavioral models and sensitivity checks, and it 
finishes with estimations of the amount of leakage that occurs among TRS members. Chapter 5 





Chapter 2 – Literature Review 
Teacher Pensions 
Informing good pension policy requires a sound understanding of the structure of pension 
systems and incentives embedded in them, especially plans that cover the largest group of public 
employees in the U.S., teachers. Research specifically on teacher pensions, however, is 
somewhat slim, though it has begun to blossom over the last several years. Studies on teacher 
retirement include examinations of the incentives embedded in pension plans (Costrell and 
Podgursky, 2009), timing of retirement decisions and implications for mobility (Costrell & 
Podgursky, 2010; Costrell & McGee, 2010; Ni & Podgursky 2011; Koedel et al. 2012; Koedel et 
al., 2013), projections of retiree health care costs (e.g. Costrell & Maloney, 2013), transition 
costs (Costrell, Podgursky, & Weller, 2011; Costrell, 2012; Biggs, 2014), plan choice (Chingos 
and West, 2013; Goldhaber and Grout, 2014b) and relationships between pension benefits and 
teacher quality (McGee, 2011; Munnell, and Fraenkel, 2013; Koedel, Podgursky, & Shi, 2013; 
Mahler, 2013). 
Seminal work by Costrell and Podgursky (2009) discuss the mechanics of how final 
average salary defined benefit (FAS DB) pension plans work and demonstrate how the back-
loading nature inherent in FAS DB plans create peculiar incentives for teachers to time their 
retirements at purely arbitrary points in their careers. They examine six state-level teacher-
covered retirement systems and illustrate the highly arbitrary and nonlinear fashion in which the 
annual accrual of pension wealth occurs from an additional year of work. Spikes in pension 
wealth from an additional year of work serve to “pull” teachers into teaching up to that point, 




wealth accrual and occur when pension wealth from an extra year of work no longer outweighs 
the marginal benefit one would receive during that year by retiring, thus serving to “push” 
teachers into retirement, including individuals who may wish to continue working and may still 
have productive years to devote to teaching. 
Costrell and Podgursky (2010) show how FAS DB plans impose substantial losses in 
pension wealth on teachers who separate from a system before retirement eligibility. This 
phenomenon stems from back-loading. Early leavers effectively transfer substantial portions of 
pension wealth to teachers who remain in the system long enough to reach retirement eligibility. 
Teachers who leave a pension system before reaching retirement eligibility incur considerable 
losses in their pension wealth, up to half in some cases, relative to teachers who remain in one 
system until retirement eligibility. Lack of portability and reciprocity among pension systems 
essentially amounts to an implicit tax on teacher mobility and partial careers, and they can have 
important implications for two-earner households. Research on career hierarchy by Winkler and 
Rose (2001) implies another consideration to the efficacy and fairness of these systems. They 
find that low earnings by women relative to men are partly attributable to the husband of a 
household being the dominant earner. Indeed, if husbands are dominant earners in the majority of 
households, and given that most teachers are women, then it is likely that many teachers in two-
income households, as secondary earners in their families, face the threat of large losses in 
pension wealth if their husbands switch to another job located outside of the pension system.  
A significant body of work examines worker responsiveness to pension incentives in 
general. Yet, although Costrell and Podgursky’s work illustrates the peculiar incentives 
embedded in teacher FAS DB plans, the literature on teachers’ behavioral response to these 




examine retirement behavior by Arkansas teachers and modeling pension incentives after Coile 
and Gruber (2000), Costrell and McGee (2010) confirm the presence of the pull-push incentives 
inherent in FAS DB systems by finding that teachers respond to the financial incentives 
underlying the pension plan. Ni and Podgursky (2011) estimate structural models to simulate the 
effect of policy changes to Missouri’s teacher pension plans from a FAS DB plan to a DC one. 
As predicted, enhancements made to the pension plan during the 1990’s lowered the overall 
retirement age, suggesting that teachers responded to these enhancements by retiring earlier. 
Moving to a smooth-accrual plan would even-out the spikes in retirement that occur in response 
to the FAS DB plan’s incentives and possibly raise the overall retirement age. Mahler (2013) 
finds that the probability of exit at retirement eligibility in North Carolina is 17 percentage points 
greater than for teachers who are two years away from eligibility, indicative of the presence of a 
“pull” force in the pension plan. 
A couple of studies directly examine the effect of pension borders (and non-reciprocity) 
on the mobility in Missouri’s education sector. Koedel et al. (2012) study school leaders in 
Missouri
30
 to analyze the effect that “pension borders” have on the flow of these employees 
across schools. Using a rich 18-year data panel, they present evidence that pension borders 
introduce significant inefficiencies into the labor market for school leaders. School leaders who 
become heavily vested in a pension system face a large incentive to remain within their pension 
system rather than crossing over and, consequently, incurring huge losses in pension wealth. The 
authors estimate that removing pension borders will double the flows of leaders across borders. 
Koedel, Ni, and Podgursky (2013) use a difference-in-differences approach to study effects of 
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 Teachers and school leaders in Missouri belong to one of three retirement plans: the state-level 
plan or local plans in Saint Louis and Kansas City. There is no reciprocity among these plans, 
meaning that service accrued in one system does not transfer to retirement benefits accrued under 




pension borders around the Saint Louis City school district on teacher mobility and find similar 
patterns as with school leaders – ultimately, pension borders lower their mobility. These findings 
suggest important implications for personnel policy where under-served and difficult-to-staff 
districts like St. Louis cannot simply coax teachers from outside by raising pay. Without 
reciprocity across pension plans, public school personnel are stuck within their pension 
boundaries. Moreover, an individual who takes a job in St. Louis or Kansas City is implicitly 
making a full-career commitment. This serves as a disincentive for individuals to teach in these 
areas in the first place. 
These effects raise questions about how pensions affect the teaching workforce’s quality. 
Several studies attempt to ascertain the role that pensions play in affecting teacher value-added. 
McGee (2011), Mahler (2013), and Koedel, Podgursky, and Shi (2013) use administrative data 
from Arkansas, North Carolina, and Missouri, respectively, and find weak to no evidence that 
suggests pensions have a significant influence on teacher value-added. Munnell and Fraenkel 
(2013) employ data from the Center for Retirement Research’s Public Plans Database and 
NCES’s School and Staffing Survey to examine how compensation, including deferred 
compensation, affects teacher quality, defined by the average SAT score at a teacher’s 
undergraduate institution. They find a significant and positive relationship between their measure 
of quality and deferred compensation. Their measure of deferred compensation, defined by an 
employer’s normal cost as a percentage of payroll, does not adequately capture the financial 
incentives inherent in each individual public pension plan, however, thus rendering comparisons 
at the plan-level rather than at the teacher level. 
Rather than addressing the structure of their retirement systems directly, states usually 




several more years after their retirement. For instance, in 1997 San Diego implemented the 
Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP) which allow employees who agree to work an 
additional five years to simultaneously continue earning a salary while collecting retirement pay 
from special accounts (Hess & Squire, 2010). Similarly, Arkansas offers the Teacher Deferred 
Retirement Option Plan, or T-DROP. Such plans, however, are expensive for inducing workers 
with good years left to stay. On the other hand, alternative retirement designs can offer more 
neutral incentives with potential to induce workers, who might otherwise be pushed out early 
under a FAS DB plan, to stay at lower cost. Some experts advocate a cash balance (CB) plan as 
one option that deserves serious consideration (Costrell and Podgursky, 2011). A defined 
contribution plan (DC) offers another viable option. Opponents to these reforms, however, 
cautiously point to “transition costs” from changing plans from FAS DB to DC or CB. Some use 
simulations to cite a fall in overall teacher effectiveness (Weller, 2011), while public retirement 
systems themselves point to rules by the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) 
that require front-loading amortization payments in the event that a system closes its FAS DB 
plan. Others have thoroughly debunked these arguments (Costrell, Podgursky, & Weller, 2011; 
Costrell, 2012). In particular, Costrell demonstrates in rigorous detail that GASB rules pertain to 
public reporting only, and pension systems may individually determine their own amortization 
schedules. 
The teacher pension literature largely points out the inefficiencies inherent in FAS DB 
plans. Such plans were originally designed for firms to retain workers for a full career and can 
levy potentially large costs on individuals who exit the system early. Teachers who leave early 
and choose to cash out their contributions are especially prone to huge costs. Unless they roll 




retirement systems by law withhold 20 percent of their refunds. Moreover, the Federal 
Government levies a 10 percent penalty for distributions taken without a rollover before an 
individual reaches age 59-½. Although the teacher pension literature has ventured into numerous 
areas important for informing policy decisions, no studies have examined teachers’ choices that 
pertain to the type of benefits they receive. There may be reasons to suspect that teachers’ 
retirement behavior differs from other public employees, however, thus warranting a closer 
examination of teachers. For instance, teachers purportedly enter their profession mostly for non-
pecuniary reasons and, therefore, may be motivated to continue working after reaching 
retirement eligibility. Research suggests that teachers are also risk averse (Bowen et al., 2013). In 
addition, because teachers comprise the largest group of public employees, studying their 
retirement behavior exclusively is a worthwhile avenue to follow. I now turn to the general 
retirement literature, which has examined this topic somewhat extensively. 
 
The Annuity Puzzle 
Economic theory predicts that teachers without bequest motives will choose to collect an 
annuity with certainty (Yaari, 1965) because of uncertainty about one’s lifespan.
31
 Converting all 
or most of one’s retirement savings into a lifetime annuity enhances utility because individuals 
do not have to worry about running out of savings regardless of how long they live. More recent 
work by Davidoff, Brown, and Diamond (2005) relax some assumptions in Yaari’s model and 
show that individuals remain better off by converting all or most of their retirement portfolios to 
an annuity, thus suggesting the importance of lifetime annuities in retirement planning. Given the 
                                                          
31
 Individuals may prefer to leave all or a portion of their funds to heirs. They cannot do so if 




optimization problem of determining the decumulation rate of retirement savings plus the 
prospect of outliving those savings, it follows that risk-adverse individuals would prefer holding 
at least most of their savings in annuitized assets.
32
 A wide body of empirical research, however, 
contradicts this conclusion, giving rise to the so-called “annuity puzzle.” This phenomenon is 
borne out in my data, where up to 35 percent of refund claimants cash out when the expected 
pension wealth they would receive by deferring a pension exceeds their refund distribution.
33
 
Table 5 summarizes annuity rates reported in the literature and displays considerable variation in 
annuitization over various settings. Annuity rates found in the public and private sectors, for 
instance, range from 15 percent to 85 percent and from 27 percent to 88 percent, respectively. I 
discuss these studies in detail later in this chapter. 
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 The decision of when to begin retirement poses a highly complex problem as it involves 
forecasting one’s life expectancy, investment outcomes, and health. 
33




Table 5: Annuitization rates found in the general retirement literature 
Study sector sample 
FAS DB 
plan 




6,072 classroom teachers 
vested in IL TRS 





11,368 terminated vested 
workers younger than age 
50 in North Carolina, quit 
during 2007-2009; all NC 
public pension plans 
67% n/a n/a 
Chalmers & 
Reuter (2012)  
public 
32,060 retirements in the 
Oregon Public Employees 
Retirement System during 
1990-2002 




11,000 military officers and 
55,000 enlisted personnel 
15%
†





80,000 enlisted personnel 
and 9,000 officers in the 
U.S. military 





i) 18,761 IBM employees, 
payout decisions during 
2000-2008 
88% n/a n/a 
ii) 103,000 benefit 
distribution decisions 
during 2002-2008 




Almost 30,000 distribution 
in a FAS DB plan and CB 
plan for two Fortune 500 
companies 
27% n/a 17% 
Banerjee (2013) private 
 Over 118,000 payout 
decisions from 84 ERISA-
qualified plans, 2005-2010  
66%* n/a n/a 
Hurd & Panis 
(2006) 
both 
3,651 respondents in the 
Health and Retirement 
Survey 
61%** n/a n/a 
Butler & Teppa 
(2007) 
both 
4,544 workers from 10 
public and private Swiss 
companies 
85%*** 56%*** n/a 
† Annuitization rates for officers and enlisted personnel are 49 percent and 8 percent, 
respectively. 
* Figure includes qualified CB plans. 
** This figure is calculated by Benartzi, Previtero, and Thaler (2011), who incorporate an 
assumption that 45.2 percent of respondents have access to a lump-sum option in their retirement 
plans. 




Explanations for the annuity puzzle include risk-sharing within households, existence of 
bequest motives, excessively high prices for annuities, and adverse selection. The economic 
principle of supply and demand dictates that high prices for annuities (perhaps due to 
administrative costs) reduce demand. Moreover, the existence of a primary income stream in 
retirement (such as Social Security or spouse’s retirement) may reduce demand for annuities by 
allowing more flexibility with retirement income so that households can take on increased 
investment risk. Adverse selection may play an important role where individuals with higher 
mortality risk may cash out at higher rates because their expected payoff will be less than 
individuals expecting to live longer. Mitchell et al. (1999) cite adverse selection as the standard 
explanation for the restricted size of the private annuity market and explain that “insurance 
premium therefore must be set high enough to compensate insurers for the longer life 
expectancies of purchasers” (p. 1299). 
Heterogeneous risk preferences offer another explanation for the annuity puzzle. Theory 
predicts that individuals with higher levels of risk aversion will prefer an annuity over a lump 
sum refund. Given research that documents sorting across public and private sectors along levels 
of risk aversion (Bellante & Link, 1981; Bonin et al., 2007; Pfeifer, 2011), one may expect to 
observe larger proportions of retirees choosing pensions over refunds in the public sector. 
Moreover, findings by Bowen et al. (2013) suggest that prospective teachers display weaker 
preferences for risk than students pursuing other professions, thereby implying that teachers in 
particular may have strong preferences for annuities. 
Heterogeneity in time preferences may also explain observed annuitization patterns. 
Economic theory predicts that individuals borrow or lend money until their internal discount rate 




then it may be the case that internal discount rates correlate with background factors. For 
example, a field experiment in Denmark conducted by Harrison, Lau, and Williams (2002) finds 
that individuals with longer investment in education, higher income, and older age exhibit lower 
internal discount rates. This may reflect more favorable borrowing or lending market interest 
rates offered to individuals with these characteristics. For instance, high-income individuals tend 
to have higher credit scores, which affect an individual’s borrowing rate of interest. Furthermore, 
discrimination may play a role where certain minority groups tend to face higher interest rates 
than whites. On the other hand, certain characteristics may shape an individual’s time 
preferences. More education may make an individual more forward-looking and teach them to 
delay gratification, thereby reducing her internal discount rate. It may also be the case that more 
patient individuals or individuals from higher-income households tend to obtain more education. 
In this sense, personal discount rates will inversely relate to educational attainment or income. 
Finally, variation in financial literacy among individuals may help to explain the puzzle 
given the role that it plays in retirement planning. The level of financial literacy is alarmingly 
low among Americans nearing retirement (Lusardi & Mitchell, 2006) and young Americans 
(Lusardi, Mitchell, & Curto, 2010). Lusardi and Mitchell (2006) fielded a questionnaire to the 
2004 Health and Retirement Study to gauge the financial literacy and extent to which 
respondents engage in retirement planning. This longitudinal survey is administered to a 
nationally representative group of individuals over age 50 (individuals on the verge of retirement 
if not already retired). The researchers find that only about half of the respondents were able to 
answer two very elementary questions correctly about inflation and compounding interest, and 
only one-third answered correctly these questions plus a third basic question about investment 




engaged these topics in every-day financial decisions. Findings suggest that financial literacy is 
highly correlated with minority group status and education level. Lusardi, Mitchell, and Curto 
(2010) find that just 27 percent of respondents from the nationally representative National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) survey were able to answer very basic questions about 
inflation, interest rates, and risk diversification. The survey questions were the same as those 
employed in Lusardi and Mitchell (2006), and the patterns of these results are similar as well, 
where gender, race/ethnicity, and educational background correlate with financial literacy. 
 
Distribution choice in the public sector 
Clark, Morrill, and Vanderweide (2013) examine distribution decisions among public 
employees in North Carolina’s Teachers’ and State Employees Retirement System and Local 
Governmental Employees’ Retirement System using administrative data during the period 2007-
2009. They do not analyze benefit choice for teachers as a subset, however. The authors control 
for the value of the lump sum refund and the present discounted value of the annuity in a set of 
linear probability models to estimate the propensity to choose the refund benefit.
34
 Results from 
choice models indicate that males exhibit a higher propensity to cash out. They are also more 
likely to take a cash distribution rather than rolling over their refund. As with this analysis, the 
authors exclude individuals who separate with eligibility for an immediate pension benefit and 
focus on separations that occur up to age 50.  About 32 percent of North Carolina public workers 
requested a lump sum distribution within one year of separation (higher than the 23 percent rate 
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 Deferred benefits are computed by assuming a 5.8 percent nominal rate of return (3.0 percent 
real return, 2.8 percent inflation), compared to my assumption of 6.5 percent (4.0 percent real, 




among Illinois teachers). About 20 percent of K-12 teachers and other education professionals 
who vest choose to cash out,
35
 much lower than groups from other public professions such as 
government, public safety, and health/social service.
36
 One possible explanation points to 
differential levels of job security, where teachers, backed by strong unions, may leave their 
contributions in the pension fund with the expectation that they may easily re-enter the teaching 
force several years later. Notably, nearly 90 percent of all refund claimants opt to receive their 
refund in cash rather than rolling them over into a retirement account. This is remarkable 
considering the taxes and early withdrawal penalties associated with these decisions. Only 12 
percent of refund claimants roll over their refund into another retirement account. 
Chalmers and Reuter (2012) examine distribution choice among public employees in the 
Oregon Public Employees’ Retirement System (OPERS) from 1990 to 2002. Under this plan, 
retirees must actively choose between two retirement benefits: a full annuity (no refund) and a 
lower-annuity with lump sum refund. About 15 percent of workers choose the lump sum refund 
benefit, implying that 85 percent of workers chose the full annuity. Thus, they observe higher 
annuity demand than documented in other settings. They also examine variation in pricing on 
annuity demand and find small effects. Notably, the authors test for the presence of adverse 
selection in annuity decisions by exploiting individual mortality data and find that workers who 
die within 2 years of retirement are almost 18 percentage points more likely to choose a lump 
sum. In addition, they find that females are less likely to choose the lump sum. These findings 
bolster the notion that individuals with longer life spans select the annuity benefit. 
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the same period.  
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Warner and Pleeter (2001) exploit the enactment of a military drawdown program to 
examine annuity decisions by military personnel and estimate individuals’ personal discount 
rates. In 1992, the U.S. Department of Defense initiated the program where it offered military 
personnel a choice between a lump sum retirement benefit and an annuity. They find that 
military personnel display strong preferences for lump sum payments to annuities. For most 
enlisted personnel and officers, the present discounted value (PDV) of the annuity substantially 
exceeded the lump sum amount.
37
 Despite the fact that the PDV of the annuity more than 
doubled the lump sum amount (under a 7-percent discount rate), over 90 percent of all enlisted 
personnel and more than half of all military officers choose the lump sum over an annuity. The 
authors estimate personal discount rates up to 30 percent. Warner and Pleeter also find variation 
in take-up decisions and discount rates for several factors. Blacks are more likely to take a lump 
sum than other minorities while whites are less likely to cash out than non-black minorities. 
Blacks also have a higher internal rate of return by over 0.063 than other nonwhites. This is not 
surprising given that blacks have a lower life expectancy than other groups. The level of 
education, scores on the Armed Forces Qualification Test, and age are inversely related with the 
take-up decision and time preference. These findings are consistent with notions that older 
individuals are less willing to take on risk and higher education levels may be indicative of 
greater financial literacy. Male enlisted personnel displayed higher discount rates and were more 
likely to take a lump sum benefit than their female counterparts, possibly due to lower life 
expectancy and higher tolerance of risk among males. 
Cunha and Menichini (2014) build on Warner and Pleeter’s work by estimating personal 
discount rates to examine benefit decisions by 80,000 enlisted personnel and 9,000 officers under 
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the National Defense Authorization Act of 2000. This act was passed in response to rising 
retirement costs in the military. Under the plan, service members reaching 15 YOS were required 
to choose between receiving a full annuity under the “High-3” plan and a $30,000 lump sum plus 
reduced annuity under the “Redux” plan. The High-3 plan was in place prior to the 2000 
enactment and allowed service members to receive a full pension after 20 years of service. 
Although the value of the High-3 benefit exceeds the value of the Redux benefit for most 
individuals, 38 percent of all service members opted for the Redux benefit over the High-3 
benefit. This reflects 42 percent of enlisted personnel and only 7 percent of officers choosing a 
Redux benefit. Choosing Redux is positively related to being male, Black, married or divorced, 
number of dependents, non-officer ranking, and younger age. In addition, estimates for 
individual discount rates exhibit positive relationships with being male, Black, divorced, number 
of dependents, and service in the Army or Marine Corps. They are negatively related to age at 
decision, single status, rank, and education level. These findings largely follow results in Warner 
and Pleeter’s analysis. The researchers estimate the overall average discount rate at about 9 
percent (or 10 percent and 6.5 percent for enlisted personnel and officers, respectively). These 
rates are lower than Warner and Pleeter’s, who estimate internal discount rates for military 
personnel at 18 percent or more, implying that service members “are not making gross mistakes 
by choosing Redux over High-3” (p. 3). 
 
Distribution Choice in the Private Sector 
Hurd and Panis (2006) examine decisions to take refunds using 1992-1998 Health and 




access to FAS DB plans. Of individuals enrolled in plans with refund options, 20 percent of 
participants elected to cash out. Of these withdrawals, most of the disbursements were put in 
savings or invested (5.6 percent of participants used at least some part of their refund for current 
consumption). 
Mottola and Utkus (2007) examine participants in define benefit plans for two Fortune 
500 companies. Of participants eligible for a lump sum disbursement, only 27 percent enrolled in 
a traditional (final average salary) FAS DB plan opt to annuitize while just 17 percent enrolled in 
a cash balance plan annuitize. In addition, regression results indicate that males, married couples, 
and wealth decrease the likelihood of annuitizing while older age is associated with a higher 
likelihood of annuitizing. 
Benartzi, Previtero, and Thaler (2011) observe annuitization rates of 88 percent and 53 
percent in payout decisions by IBM employees during 2000-2008 and employees from 112 FAS 
DB plans during 2002-2008, respectively. The authors note a caveat, however, with the annuity 
rate for IBM employees in which the company attempted to encourage early retirement by 
enhancing the annuity option for employees under age 65 by 15 to 20 percent. The annuitization 
rate for employees that did not receive this enhancement was 61 percent. Data on the second 
sample also includes employees covered by cash balance (CB) plans and indicate a 41 percent 
annuity rate. Thus, employees in this sample cash out at a higher rate if they belong to a CB plan. 
In addition, males, younger workers, and individuals with smaller retirement accounts are more 
likely to cash out. 
Banerjee (2013) examines 118,000 payout decisions (annuity versus lump sum 




annuitization is directly related to restrictions placed on taking lump sum disbursements. Overall, 
66 percent of distributions analyzed were annuities. Plans without LS options experienced a 99 
percent annuitization rate while plans without restrictions on LS withdrawals had the lowest 
annuitization rate (27 percent). Annuitization increases with age and tenure. 
Finally, Butler and Teppa (2007) examine benefit decisions by workers from ten public 
and private companies in Switzerland. Nine of these companies offer an annuity as the default 
option. Of employees in the three companies covered by a FAS DB plan, 85 percent chose an 
annuity, compared to 56 percent of individuals in companies not covered by a FAS DB plan.  
There is significant variation in annuitization rates across plans within public and private 
sectors. In the public arena, annuitization rates overall range from 15 percent to 85 percent. 
Military personnel, however, exhibit much lower annuity rates. This is particularly puzzling 
because the present discounted values of individuals’ annuities in many cases exceeded the 
values of their lump-sum benefit options. Plans for non-military personnel experience fairly high 
annuitization rates, ranging from 67 percent to 85 percent. High annuity rates are consistent with 
expectations because refunds in these plans grant only employee contributions, which render 
them substantially less valuable than annuities. 
As in the public sector, substantial variation occurs in annuitization rates overall in the 
private sector ranging from 27 percent to 88 percent. After excluding the portion of IBM 
employees examined in Benartzi, Previtero, and Thaler (2011) who faced an enhanced annuity 
option, however, the highest observed annuity rate becomes 66 percent. Taken as a whole, the 
studies discussed above suggest that workers covered by civilian public pension plans annuitize 




differences in how the values for refund distributions are determined, discussed in Chapter 1. 
While refunds must equal the present discounted value of the annuity in the private sector, this is 
not the case in the public sector, where most public pension plans include only the member’s 
contributions while excluding the employer portion. Thus, refunds are considerably less lucrative 
in the public sector, which subsequently leads to higher annuity rates.  
 
Retirement studies that control for internal rates of return 
Studies on other areas of retirement employ similar methodologies used in this analysis 
by controlling for the internal rate of return. Behavioral research (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 
1991; Tversky & Kahneman, 1991) suggests that individuals facing alternative choices tend to 
consider what they already have as a reference point. If the alternative choice does not provide a 
benefit at least as generous as what they have, then a person may not choose that option. In the 
context of teacher public pension plans, a vested teacher in a FAS DB plan who separates before 
reaching retirement eligibility and therefore faces a choice between a lump sum refund and a 
deferred annuity may regard the annuity as her reference point. Economic theory predicts that 
she will choose the benefit at higher value. In order to control for individuals’ reference points, 
researchers calculate the rate that equalizes the values of the choices and include them in their 
models. A couple of recent studies employ this method in analyzing the determinants of choice 
among pension plans. 
Goldhaber and Grout (2014b) and Yang (2005) examine retirement plan choice and 
compute the internal rate of return (IROR) that equalizes the present discounted value of the 




examine Washington public school teachers’ choices between a FAS DB plan and Hybrid plan.
38
 
A teacher with a higher IROR will likely exhibit a lower propensity to choose DC or hybrid plans 
because these choices require her to assume a higher return by the DC component to produce the 
same benefit as under the FAS DB plan. Likewise, a teacher with a low IROR is more likely to 
choose the Hybrid plan because she requires a lower return from the DC portion to produce an 
equivalent benefit. The authors find that factors associated with a higher propensity to choose the 
hybrid plan include younger age, being male or white, higher salary, physical education/health 
endorsements, and working in urban/suburban locales. The finding that white teachers exhibit a 
higher propensity for choosing the hybrid plan than African American teachers is surprising 
when one considers differences in life expectancy between the two groups. Whites may arguably 
exhibit a higher propensity to choose the FAS DB plan because of a higher life expectancy. On 
the other hand, African Americans in general may have less trust in financial markets than 
whites, for understandable historical reasons. Finally, they include an indicator to account for the 
financial crisis in 2008. The estimated coefficient indicates that teachers are less likely to choose 
the hybrid plan, consistent with the notion that the economic recession dampened confidence in 
the financial markets and, subsequently, teachers’ willingness to take on financial risk by 
choosing the plan with a DC component. 
Yang (2005) analyzes choices between FAS DB and DC plans made by employees in a 
non-profit. On average, the IROR is 9 percent. Between the two comparison groups, DC-
choosers exhibit a lower IROR than employees remaining in the FAS DB plan (7 percent versus 
14 percent). The coefficient on IROR is negative and statistically significant in the choice 
models. Consistent with results from other studies, the authors find that factors associated with a 
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lower propensity to choose a DC plan include higher IROR, older age, having shorter tenure, 
being male or African American, and belonging to a union. 
 
Studies that use survey data to estimate time preferences 
Another body of retirement research employs survey methods to estimate personal 
discount rates, typically by asking respondents to choose between some amount of money or 
goods today and a larger amount in the future. DeArmond and Goldhaber (2010) survey teachers 
in Washington State in order to ascertain the determinants of preferences for pension plans. 
Although time preferences among teachers is not the focus of their study, the survey includes a 
question that asks teachers to choose between a large sum of money 20 years later and a smaller 
sum of money today. This question affords them an estimate of teachers’ implicit discount rates, 
separable into three groups: less than 0.04, between 0.04 and 0.08, and more than 0.08. A larger 
implicit discount rate (being more present-oriented) is associated with stronger preferences for a 
DC plan than a FAS DB plan. Overall, the authors’ results show that veteran teachers display 
stronger preferences for a FAS DB plan than a DC plan while new entrants exhibit stronger 
preferences for a DC plan than FAS DB plan. Similar to this study, several papers use survey 
data to analyze retirement decisions and estimate time preferences. 
Brown, Casey, and Mitchell (2008) employ survey data from the 2004 Health and 
Retirement Study to examine preferences for choosing an annuity over a lump sum payment. 
Overall, three-fifths of respondents in the data indicated a preference to trade half of their Social 
Security payments throughout the remainder of their lives for a lump sum payment up front plus 




likelihood of an individual choosing a lump sum payment plus reduced annuity include younger 
age, poor health, unemployment (likely because of liquidity constraints associated with being 
unemployed), and more education. Conditional on education, more financially sophisticated 
individuals are more likely to prefer the full annuity. 
Klawitter, Anderson, and Gugerty (2012) use survey responses to estimate the discount 
rates for a group of individuals eligible for a matched savings programs for low-income 
households. The survey presents three hypothetical loan amounts, each at 3-month, 6-month, or 
1-year payment periods, and asks individuals to select the amount they would prefer to pay back 
given a set of choices. They find that discount rates vary with horizon – higher discount rates are 
elicited for shorter payment periods and for smaller loan amounts. In addition, discount rates are 
higher, on average, for respondents who are non-Black, are native English speakers, have 
children, have education to high school, and are younger. 
Finke and Huston (2013) survey 6,812 undergraduate and graduate students to model 
time discounting as a predictor of importance that students place on retirement savings. The 
authors estimate time preference under four different methods. Two methods use numerical 
techniques common in the time discounting literature,
39
 and two techniques are based on eight 
intertemporal behaviors as proxies for time discounting. The analysis finds that time preference 
is significantly predictive of students placing importance on retirement savings. Measures of 
time preference that employed intertemporal behaviors explained more variation in students’ 
importance on retirement savings than more traditional measures. 
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Beshears et al. (2013) conduct a survey that asks respondents about their willingness to 
annuitize based on a set of hypothetical factors. Five significant findings emerge from their 
work. First, individuals express three factors that play an important role in their annuitization 
decisions: a desire to have adequate retirement wealth later in life, flexibility in spending, and 
concern about whether their company will run out of resources to pay for retirement benefits 
down the line. Second, the proportion of individuals who decide to annuitize increases when 
given the option to annuitize a portion of their funds rather than an “all-or-nothing” ultimatum. 
This is particularly relevant to the design of FAS DB plans, particularly in the public sector, 
because most of these systems offer only two choices in this area: collect an annuity later in life 
or take a claim on their entire contributions as a lump sum. Third, respondents prefer annuities 
characterized by flat or increasing stream of payments, implying an important role for COLA 
adjustments. Fourth, framing the annuity decision in light of flexibility and control as well as 
discussing investment features decreases the likelihood of annuitizing. Finally, most respondents 
prefer to pick a month where they receive a bonus payment rather than the traditional level 
stream of payments. Although questions in these surveys base scenarios on companies offering 
retirement plans, this study certainly opens an avenue for future research to examine retirement 
preferences by public sector employees. 
Brown (2001) employs data from the Health Retirement Survey and uses a life-cycle 
model to develop a utility-based measure of an agent’s valuation of annuitization. This measure, 
called annuity equivalent wealth, represents the amount of money an individual in the annuities 
market would require to maintain the same level of utility when annuitization is unavailable. An 
increase in annuity equivalent wealth is significantly positively related to the probability that an 




couples, lending credence to the notion that pooling mortality risk within households reduces the 
propensity to annuitize. An individual’s health and time horizon for financial planning are 
positively related to an individual planning to annuitize. Contrary to previous research and 
Yaari’s theory, however, Brown finds no evidence that bequest motives play an important role in 
decisions to annuitize. 
 
Summary 
The literature on teacher pensions thoroughly demonstrates the arbitrary incentives 
embedded in defined benefit plans. Economic theory predicts that pension plans characterized by 
smooth pension wealth accrual will lead to gains in efficiency in the labor market. Research on 
teacher pensions has yet to venture into exploring teachers’ choices that pertain to benefit 
distributions, however, though a body of evidence in this area exists in the general retirement 
literature, where findings point to an “annuity puzzle.” Although theory predicts high rates of 
annuitization, substantial variation occurs in actual take-up. The general literature is fairly 
consistent in its findings that pertain to the determinants of annuitization. Factors associated with 
higher cashout rates include lower education levels, young age, poor health, being minority or 
male, and low tenure. Workers in civilian public pension plans appear to annuitize at much 
higher rates than private sector workers. Examination of annuity decisions made by teachers as a 
standalone group is warranted, however, and this study aims to fill a gap in the teacher pension 
literature by exclusively studying a group of teachers covered by a typical state-level public 




Chapter 3 – Methodology and Data 
Merely controlling for age, earnings, and service may be insufficient because they 
interact in ways that create highly idiosyncratic incentives embedded in FAS DB plans. In the 
context of benefit choice, developing a framework that controls for the relative attractiveness of 
plan options is important and requires incorporating these highly nonlinear incentives. 
Otherwise, their omission from behavioral models may generate biased estimates. I employ three 
different individual-specific measures that account for the tradeoffs in benefit options: teachers’ 
pension-wealth-to-cash-out ratios (PWCOR), the difference between pension wealth and refund 
amount (NetPW), and internal rate of return (IROR). This chapter begins by considering the 
difficulties posed to this analysis. It then discusses the theoretical framework, followed by a 
description of the data and summary statistics with a focus on the key analytic variables. 
 
Analytic challenges 
At least two important factors affect retirement decisions and pose analytic challenges. 
First, financial incentives embedded in FAS DB pension plans are highly idiosyncratic; yet, these 
incentives play an important role in timing decisions, and studies demonstrate that workers 
respond to them (Chan and Stevens, 2004; Asch, Haider, and Zissimopoulos, 2005; Furgeson, 
Strauss, and Vogt, 2006; Costrell and McGee, 2010; Ni and Podgursky, 2011; Koedel et al., 
2012). Second, heterogeneity in individuals’ life circumstances shape time preferences and 
arguably impact retirement decisions in important ways.
40
 While an advantage of this paper’s 
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analysis lies in its ability to directly control for the first factor, an admitted shortcoming lies in its 
inability to estimate time preferences. 
While several retirement studies rely on survey data to estimate personal discount rates 
(Brown, 2001; Brown, Casey, and Mitchell, 2008; Finke & Huston, 2013; Klawitter, Anderson, 
& Gugerty, 2013) a couple have been able to employ data on actual retirement-related decisions 
to generate estimates of personal discount rates (Warner & Pleeter, 2001; Cunha & Menichini, 
2013). Studies that rely on survey data face several challenges. The first, “hypothetical bias,” 
suggests that a respondent’s answer differs from how she would actually behave if a scenario 
was real. Second, complex survey questions may confuse a respondent or cause her to give up, 
thus rendering responses invalid. Third, the existence of latent variables such as risk preference, 
impulsivity, or thrift may lead to bias if they are omitted from the model. Finally, respondent 
bias (selection bias) may pose a particular concern for analyses with low response rates. For 
these reasons, some researchers instead seek out observations of individuals’ actual behavior in 
lieu of stated preferences. 
Economists often assume that revealed preferences reflect an individual’s true tastes (e.g. 
Trivitt & Wolf 2011). Beshears et al. (2008), however, argue several reasons why normative 
preferences (an individual’s true preferences) may in fact differ from revealed preferences (an 
individual’s observed behavior). For example, an individual may prefer to enroll in a defined 
benefit plan but, for some unobserved reason, may actually enroll in a defined contribution plan. 
This individual’s choice is likely influenced by some kind of decision-making error. Reasons for 
normative preferences differing from revealed preferences include passive choice (common 
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when a default choice is involved), complexity, misinformation, limited personal experience, and 
third-party marketing. The analytic setting for this dissertation mitigates several of these issues.  
One acknowledged limitation in this analysis includes occurrences when teachers make 
choices about their benefits that differ from their true, unobserved preferences that would be 
revealed under perfect information. Although teachers receive benefit statements that disclose 
the value of their refund benefits and monthly pension benefits, statements report refundable 
contributions as a lump sum amount but pension benefits as a monthly payment.
41
 They do not 
report these benefits in a way that offers an apples-to-apples comparison (e.g. either both benefits 
as lump sums or both benefits as monthly payments). Nonetheless, complexity and 
misinformation are likely mitigated as sources of error because members can contact TRS to 
obtain an estimate of their benefits, and they receive annual benefit statements. TRS also 
provides its members with information on its web site, including an online benefits calculator. 
Moreover, discussions about refundable contributions as a benefit (e.g. on financial statements or 
in member guides) usually include words of caution stating that refund claims not only terminate 
all other TRS benefits, but purchasing service credit after re-entering service can be costly.
42
 
While complexity increases with the number of choices, vested TRS members make just 
two choices – taking a lump sum disbursement of contributions and deferring an annuity. Finally, 
people often learn about what is in their best interest from experiences and feedback. Thus, 
limited personal experience with retirement income could potentially drive a wedge between 
normative and revealed preferences for TRS members. I believe that this potential obstacle is 
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minimal, however, because TRS members have access to a wide set of resources to help them 
determine the course of action best suited to their circumstances.
43
 These reasons lend 
confidence that revealed preferences offer an accurate depiction of normative preferences in this 
analysis’s setting. 
My data afford an examination of teachers’ revealed preferences on cash-out decisions. I 
employ powerful measures to control for financial incentives in behavioral models. While 
studies on benefit decisions in FAS DB plans control for age, tenure, and wealth (Mottola and 
Utkus , 2007; Banerjee, 2013), they do not include measures that capture the highly nonlinear 
financial incentives typically embedded in the FAS DB plans. Estimating pension wealth is one 
powerful technique that captures these incentives and provides a key component for this analysis. 
I also develop measures that allow comparability between the values of a refund withdrawal and 
deferred annuity and include them in choice models to estimate the impact of individual, 
professional, school, and district characteristics on the propensity to cash out. The next section 
discusses the measures central to this analysis. 
 
Dependent and key analytic variables 
The dependent variable comprises an individual teacher’s decision to cash out her 
refundable contributions or leave her contributions in the pension fund, presumably to defer an 
annuity when she becomes eligible to collect. This variable takes a value of zero if a teacher is 
categorized in the data as “Inactive” and one if she filed a claim on her refundable contributions 
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and took a disbursement.
44
 Individual teachers’ PWCOR, NetPW, and IROR comprise the key 
control variables. 
Denoting PWCORis as the pension wealth to cashout ratio observed in individual i who 
separates at age s, I can estimate PWCORis by the equation 
     PWCORis = PWis/LSWis    (1) 
where PWis is the present discounted value of the pension wealth for an individual conditional on 
separation at age s, and LSWis is the value of her lump sum withdrawal conditional on separation 
at age s. NetPWis is defined as 
      NetPWis = PWis –  LSWis    (2) 
Pension wealth is employed widely in the teacher pension literature (e.g. Costrell and 
Podgursky, 2009; Costrell and McGee, 2010) and gives the present value of the stream of a 
teacher’s annuity payments discounted for survival probabilities. I use gender-by-race survival 
rates to discount annuity payments. Discounting the stream of future payments back to the point 
of separation allows comparability between the values of both PW and LSW at a single point. 
Pension wealth is defined by: 
  ( )  ∑
   ( | )     ( | )
(   )(   )   
    (3) 
where Ben(R|S) is the value of the annuity, collectible at age R conditional on separating at age 
S. In words, the pension wealth for a teacher eligible for an annuity at age R who separates from 
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 This claim refers to distributions of refundable contributions. It is possible for TRS members 
to file multiple refund claims during her career. I observe 13 individuals hired after 1980 that 




service at age S is the sum of the stream of annuity payments, weighted by conditional survival 
probabilities, Surv(R|S), and discounted back to the present at rate r.  
For most of the analysis, I assume the real rate of return at 4 percent and inflation at 2.5 
percent.
45
 TRS assumes a 5.0 percent real interest rate in its actuarial valuations.
46
 It is important 
to note that PW depends on an assumption for the interest rate. A lower interest rate implies 
larger NetPW and vice versa. My assumption is the same rate employed by Koedel, Ni, and 
Podgursky (2014). Coile and Gruber (2007) and Coile et al. (2002) find that higher discount rates 
(they use 6 percent) are associated with early Social Security benefit claims. As this paper’s 
analysis attempts to model behavior, discount rates higher than risk-free rates (e.g. 2 percent) are 
indicated in this setting.
47
 
Computation of the second component of PWCOR, the refund amount, is straightforward. 
For a teacher separating at year t after T years of service, it is simply the sum of products of each 
year’s observed salary (salaryt) and the effective refund rate (ct):
48
 
     ∑ (  )(       )
 
       (4) 
It is important to note that the analysis does not account for the value of retiree health 
insurance (RHI). Clark, Morrill, and Vanderweide (2013) estimate the present discounted value 
of RHI for employees in North Carolina at between $37,000 and $48,000, depending on age and 
gender. Including RHI would raise the value of deferred benefits, and the gap between the values 
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 The average change in CPI over the sample period is 2.43 percent, close to the 2.5 percent I 
assume in this analysis. 
46
 Starting in FY2014, TRS lowered its assumed nominal rate of return from 8.5 percent to 8.0 
percent (TRS, 2012). The assumed real interest rate decreased from 5.0 percent to 4.75 percent. 
47
 I also report results based on 2 percent and 6 percent assumptions. 
48




of total benefits and refund will likely be substantially larger than NetPW alone. Therefore, 
estimates of the key control variables in this analysis represent a lower-bound. 
Finally, because PWCOR and NetPW depend on assumptions about the interest rate, I use 
an alternative measure of the relative values of benefit options, IROR. This measure computes 
the rate that equalizes the stream of annuity payments with the teacher’s lump sum refund, 
conditional on separation at age s. In other words, IROR provides the rate that renders the net 
present value of all cash flows (i.e. both the refund distribution and the stream of annuity 
payments) to be zero. Thus, IROR solves the following equation: 
       ∑
          ( )
(      )   
   
           (5)  
where s denotes an individual’s separation age. I consider cash flows up to age 100.
49
 A higher 
IROR implies a more desirable annuity. Although an individual teacher’s personal discount rate 
(denoted PDR) is unobserved, one may infer a general relationship between teachers’ 
intertemporal tastes and IROR. If IROR > PDR, then theory predicts that she takes the annuity, 
ceteris paribus. If IROR < PDR, then one expects that she will take a lump sum refund. 
Inactive teachers who cash out may do so with the intention of changing jobs and using at 
least a portion of their account to purchase additional service credit in another pension system. In 
this case, it is unclear if estimates of PWCOR and NetPW will be understated or overstated. They 
will be understated if she actually earns a larger benefit, which is possible if she continues 
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 Because the mortality tables used for this analysis indicate that the probability of dying 




service in a reciprocal system.
50
 Estimates will be overstated if she earns a lower benefit from 
working in a different system, which is likely if there is no reciprocity across pension plans 
(Costrell & Podgursky, 2010). Unfortunately, my data do not allow me to observe this activity 
for teachers leaving the state, though I do observe movement from TRS to other reciprocal 
retirement systems within Illinois. 
Because ratios possess idiosyncratic mathematical properties, I include NetPW as an 
alternative measure for quantifying the tradeoffs in benefit choices. Teachers who opt for a 
refund near or at retirement eligibility may experience significant or unusual life events that 
drive their decision. For instance, various life shocks or emergencies may necessitate immediate 
cash. Thus, I estimate choice models using samples that restrict separations up to age 50. 
 
Behavioral Model 
Studies show that earned service credit, separation age, and earnings are important 
predictors of cashout decisions (Mottola and Utkus, 2007; Banerjee, 2013). Thus, I include these 
variables in a series of choice models to estimate the propensity to cash out. I estimate the 
primary models using logit regression.
51
 Defining COi=1 if teacher i takes a lump sum 
withdrawal and COi=0 if she leaves her refundable contributions in the pension fund, I express 
the behavioral model as: 
COi = α + βagei + γYOSi + δsalaryi + ρXi + θTi+ κSi+ πDi + λafter2008i + εi (6) 
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 This assumes that her service credits transfer and she earns about the same salary as when she 
exited TRS. If she ends up with a lower final average salary than if she remained in TRS, her 
pension benefits will be lower under the same benefit formula. 
51




where agei is teacher i's age at separation, YOSi indicates years of service, and salaryi represents 
earnings for determining retirement benefits. The vectors Xi, Ti, Si, and Di, denote individual, 
professional, school, and district characteristics, respectively, and include gender, race/ethnicity, 
school level taught, endorsement areas, post-secondary education, a districts’ urbanicity, and 
district level student demographics. The last term, εi, is a stochastic error term. I also include an 
indicator for years after FY2008, when the financial crisis occurred, because this economic 
shock impacted countless individuals’ retirement accounts in the private sector and subsequently 
may have affected salaries, job prospects, and retirement decisions for workers in both private 
and public sectors. On one hand, the recession likely increased the pool of cash-constrained 
individuals and households and subsequently increased the demand for cash now (and the 
likelihood for cashing out). On the other hand, the recession may have dampened people’s 
perceptions about financial markets, increased concern about putting money in financial 
institutions, or changed people’s risk preferences. Because an annuity is generally much less 
risky than cashing out, the recession plausibly increased annuity demand. 
Specification (6) does not account for the idiosyncratic incentives typically found in FAS 
DB plans and, therefore, may yield biased estimates. For these reasons, I also estimate choice 
models that replace the set of controls agei, YOSi, and salaryi with PWCORi, NetPWi, or IRORi, 
to capture these factors.
52
 Moreover, controlling for PWCOR, NetPW, and IROR affords an 
economic interpretation for cashout-related decisions whereas age, YOS, and salary do not 
convey information about the tradeoffs related to distribution choices. 
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 Replacing the set {age, YOS, and salary} rather than adding them with PWCOR, NetPW, or 
IROR avoids over-controlling, as the latter group of variables are largely determined by age, 




A simple illustration of distribution choice tradeoffs 
PWCOR and NetPW quantify the financial tradeoffs that vested teachers face in making 
refund/annuity decisions and convey the extent to which deferring an annuity is financially 
favorable or unfavorable relative to cashing out, ceteris paribus.
53
 Recall Figure 2, which 
illustrates these tradeoffs for a representative female teacher in Illinois who begins working in 
the Springfield public school district at age 25 under Tier 1.
 
The solid line represents pension 
wealth accrual over the course of a career, and each point represents the present value of her 
annuity accrued up to that point in service. The dashed line gives the refund amounts for each 
separation age under the current plan. Differences between the benefits are striking. 
 This teacher does not accrue any PW until she vests after 5 years. Thus, LSW exceeds 
PW early in her career, though the gap between the two benefits is quite small. PW quickly 
overtakes the refund benefit, however, where the crossover point occurs after age 34 (9 YOS). 
The gap (or NetPW) after the crossover point widens at a very rapid rate. NetPW reaches nearly 
$25,000 by age 40 and doubles in three years after that. It doubles again to $103,000 three years 
later. By age 50, NetPW is over $190,000. The gap peaks at age 60, reaching $560,000. 
Individuals experiencing life events that require immediate cash face difficult choices and huge 
potential capital losses under this current plan. 
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 I do not claim that these decisions are irrational because I cannot view the life circumstances 
surrounding teachers’ decisions. The extent to which households are cash constrained, 
expectations about life span, and bequest motives are all likely to weigh on decisions. The key 
measures used in this analysis offer an interesting and unique way to quantify the tradeoffs that 





This analysis relies on three sources of data: detailed individual-level longitudinal data 
obtained from the Illinois Teachers’ Retirement System (TRS) and the Illinois State Board of 
Education (ISBE); and enrollment data from the National Center for Education Statistics 
(NCES). TRS and ISBE each provide unique identification numbers which enable reliable 
tracking of teachers over time. ISBE staffing records are necessary in order to identify classroom 
teachers because TRS does not track its members’ employment positions. I merge TRS and ISBE 
data by matching on name, employer (school district), gender, creditable earnings, and years of 
creditable service. ISBE provides state-specific and NCES-specific district codes which allow 
me to link the main data with NCES data. 
TRS data include detailed information including full name, employer (school district), 
gender, creditable earnings, years of service, member status, hire date and age, separation date 
and age, types of retirement benefits, final average salary, refund amount, service credit 
purchases, sick leave, disability claims, extra service credit, and individuals’ full earnings 
histories. In addition, the data include detailed information on refunds including the type of 




(e.g. 401K, Roth IRA, 408A/408B, etc.).
54
 Finally, TRS data identifies inactive members who 
separated from TRS and entered service in a reciprocal Illinois retirement system.
55
 
ISBE administrative data includes each teacher’s full name, employer, gender, creditable 
earnings, years of experience, position, type of employment, full-time equivalency, 
race/ethnicity, post-secondary education degrees, degree-granting institutions within Illinois, and 
teaching endorsements. NCES data at the district level include total enrollment, urbanicity, free-
reduced lunch (FRL) program enrollment, English language learner (ELL) enrollment, Individual 
Education Plan (IEP) enrollment, and pupil-teacher ratios. I impute missing categorical 
enrollment data with a simple means imputation method. I also control for college quality where 
I define elite institutions within Illinois as those ranked in the Top-50 by U.S. News and World 
Report. Unfortunately, this measure is somewhat noisy because ISBE data do not identify 
attendance at colleges and universities outside of Illinois. 
These data and the analytic setting lend several advantages to an analysis on the 
determinants of refund-related decisions. First, I directly observe the parameters that TRS uses 
for determining benefits and important factors that affect retirement decisions and benefits. Thus, 
I can precisely estimate an individual’s pension wealth accrued up to any point in her career 
while accounting for survival probabilities. Moreover, because benefit choices involve large 
stakes, I expect teachers to spend more time and careful thought on their decisions than in a 
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 Data on rollovers and separation age allow me to adjust refund claims for taxes and early 
withdrawal penalties, thus arguably allowing a more precise estimate of the tradeoffs that face 
teachers when choosing a benefit. On the other hand, these adjusted refunds could be measured 
with error because teachers can still avoid the 20 percent non-rollover tax if they do not roll over 
their refunds through TRS. As long as a teacher makes his own arrangements to roll over a 
refund within 60 days of receiving it (which I do not observe), he will not incur the 20 percent 
tax by doing this. 
55





laboratory setting. Second, while economic theory suggests additional sources of retirement 
income, such as lifetime payments from Social Security, as an important determinant of 
annuitization decisions, TRS does not contribute to Social Security. Thus, an analysis on 
retirement decisions by TRS members mitigates this source of endogeneity.
56,57
 Finally, as no 
studies to date have systematically examined refund/annuity choices by public school teachers as 
a standalone group, this paper offers the first systematic examination of cash-out-related 
decisions by this important group. 
 
Sample for Behavioral Analysis 
 This analysis focuses on vested teachers enrolled in TRS who quit service as a full-time 
teacher
58
 and excludes teachers who entered the workforce under Tier 2 because they have not 
vested yet.
59
 Teachers in the Chicago Public School District belong to a separate pension fund, 
the Chicago Teachers’ Pension Fund. I do not observe the complete set of records for Illinois 
teachers that spent all or part of their time there and exclude them from the analysis as well. I 
also exclude movers, defined as inactive members who left TRS to continue working in a 
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 See Footnote 8 in Chapter 1 for details. 
57
 I do not observe households with other sources of retirement income, including spouses with 
Social Security. For two-person households, retirement decisions are usually made at the 
household level rather than the individual level. Incomplete data that does not include 
information on spouses pose an obstacle for many analyses on annuity decisions, and I 
acknowledge this limitation. 
58
 Teachers not vested do not receive an opportunity to choose a deferred lifetime annuity. TRS 
offers its non-vested members the option to collect a “Single-Sum Refund,” a lump sum 
disbursement actuarially equivalent to an annuity starting at age 65 based on the formula  
 Annuity = (0.0167)*(FAS)*(YOS).  
This analysis excludes the 0.24 percent of teachers who received this benefit. 
59
 Members entering on or after January 1, 2011 are automatically enrolled under Tier 2. Under 




reciprocal system because data pertains to members’ time while working under TRS.
60
 Because 
ISBE staffing data start in FY 1980, the analysis examines teachers hired in or after FY 1980. 
Finally, the sample includes teachers who quit during the period 2002-2011.
61
 In the working 
sample, I observe 27 percent of teachers choosing to cash out, whereas the cashout rate for all 





This section discusses summary statistics for the key control variables and demographic 
differences between refund claimants and annuitants. Table 6 provides rates of distribution 
choice by individual, professional, school, and district characteristics. Teachers who leave in 
their 20’s annuitize at a 69 percent rate. This rate rises for teachers who separate in their 30’s and 
40’s to about 75 percent, but then drops back to the 69 percent for teachers who leave after age 
50. This latter decline, however, likely reflects teachers who entered service at an older age and 
left with fewer service accruals. Annuitization rates increase with service years. These patterns 
also reflect the fact that service years more directly determine the level of benefits rather than 
age. 
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 Data for teachers who move from a reciprocal system to TRS include service credits earned 
and reported under their previous plan. Identifying this group of movers is not necessary for the 
analysis. 
61
 Data on FRL, a widely-used proxy for students’ family incomes, is not available prior to 2002. 
62
 The working sample represents 40 percent of TRS members who ever taught and are observed 
as inactive or refund claimants.  
Of all TRS vested members (including non-classroom teachers) hired since 1980, I observe 
21,379 members as inactive or claiming a refund. Within this group, 36 percent cashed out their 





About 60 percent of males annuitize, significantly lower than the 76 percent of females 
who do so. Lower annuity rates also occur among African American and Hispanic teachers, high 
school teachers, teachers with less post-secondary education, and teachers in rural districts. 
Higher annuity rates are observed among teachers who are female, white or Asian, teach in 
grades PK-8, graduated from an elite college in Illinois, and teach in a suburban and city school 
districts. Overall, these observations are consistent with other studies that observe higher cashout 
rates among males, minority groups, and individuals with less education (e.g. Warner & Pleeter, 
2001; Klawitter, Anderson, and Gugerty, 2012; Mottola and Utkus, 2007). Ceteris paribus, 
members of a group that is more likely to cash out, on average, have higher discount rates. Thus, 
the findings above are also consistent with studies that find higher discount rates among 












  Rate # obs Rate # obs 
Overall 0.73 4,434 0.27 1,624 
Separation age 
    exit age 20-29 0.69 783 0.31 346 
exit age 30-39 0.75 2,624 0.25 880 
exit age 40-49 0.74 728 0.26 261 
exit 50 and over 0.69 299 0.31 137 
Tenure 
    5-10 YOS 0.71 3,304 0.29 1,350 
10-15 YOS 0.79 946 0.21 248 
15-20 YOS 0.87 167 0.13 26 
20 and up YOS 1.00 17 0.00 0 
Gender and race/ethnicity 
    Female 0.76 3,777 0.24 1,179 
Male 0.60 657 0.40 445 
White 0.74 4,172 0.26 1,457 
Black or African American 0.46 69 0.54 81 
Hispanic or Latino 0.63 120 0.37 69 
Asian, Pacific Islander, or Hawaiian 0.81 71 0.19 17 
School Level Taught 
    PK-8 0.74 2,809 0.26 986 
HS 0.71 981 0.29 410 
SPED 0.74 644 0.26 228 
Post-secondary school 
    Bachelor's degree 0.73 3,839 0.27 1,412 
Graduate degree 0.74 594 0.26 210 
not IL elite college or out-of-state 0.72 3,997 0.28 1,521 
IL elite college (Top 50 national) 0.81 437 0.19 103 
out-of-state school 0.74 1,276 0.26 457 
in-state school 0.73 3,158 0.27 1,167 
Endorsements 
    Art 0.73 301 0.27 111 
ELA 0.75 1,035 0.25 351 
Foreign language 0.73 290 0.27 106 
Math or Science 0.74 574 0.26 204 
Social Science 0.74 982 0.26 347 










  Rate # obs Rate # obs 
District urbanicity 
    City 0.73 632 0.27 231 
Suburb 0.75 2,657 0.25 881 







Table 7: Summary statistics by distribution choice, individual, professional, and district characteristics 
  Refund-claimants (n=1,624) Annuitants (n=4,434)   
  mean SD min max mean SD min max t-test sig 
PWCOR 0.87 0.62 0.29 4.42 0.88 0.59 0.34 5.08   
Net PW -1,901 19,759 -28,355 187,856 -366 25,665 -28,083 427,207 ** 
PW at sep'n 25,603 25,944 2,414 254,525 30,065 34,578 5,048 531,891 *** 
LSW 27,504 12,127 6,356 151,912 30,431 14,019 8,493 137,926 *** 
IROR 0.037 0.029 0.011 0.284 0.037 0.024 0.013 0.364   
hire age 27.0 7.2 20.0 61.0 25.9 6.1 20.0 59.0 *** 
separation age 35.8 7.8 25.0 69.0 35.5 7.1 26.0 68.0   
YOS 7.7 2.5 5.0 19.8 8.3 3.0 5.0 23.3 *** 
earnings (2011 dollars) 39,090 7,495 2,572 70,768 39,099 7,805 1,786 104,994   
Dist enrollment 7,050 8,858 21 41,446 6,547 8,009 21 41,446 ** 
Dist pupil-teacher ratio 16.3 4.1 1.0 121.0 16.2 2.5 0.6 25.4   
Dist % IEP 0.157 0.036 0.000 0.358 0.156 0.034 0.000 0.322   
Dist % FRL 0.340 0.231 0.002 0.987 0.318 0.225 0.002 0.985 *** 
Dist % Native Am 0.002 0.004 0.000 0.070 0.002 0.008 0.000 0.288   
Dist % Asian 0.038 0.053 0.000 0.364 0.045 0.060 0.000 0.441 *** 
Dist % Hispanic 0.162 0.205 0.000 0.954 0.164 0.202 0.000 0.955   
Dist % Black 0.142 0.222 0.000 0.995 0.125 0.198 0.000 0.996 *** 
Dist % white 0.635 0.300 0.000 1.000 0.641 0.283 0.000 1.000   
The last column indicates the significance of t-test results where *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; pension wealth is computed in 
2011 dollars and are based on 4 percent real rate of return and 2.5 percent inflation assumptions plus gender- and race-specific 
survival probabilities from the CDC's 2007 Life Tables; they are not adjusted for taxes or early withdrawal penalties; statistics are 
based on sample that includes all separation ages. Sample includes TRS members hired in or after 1980 who quit working as a 
full-time teacher during 2002-2011, who vested in the system, and who never worked in the City of Chicago Public Schools 




Table 7 provides summary statistics of retirement and district-level variables for the 
refund claimants and annuitants groups. Refund claimants, on average, accrue $25,603 in PW 
while annuitants accrue $30,065. The average refund credited to members, $27,504, is $1,901 
more than the present discounted value of the annuity they could receive. The average PWCOR 
for refund claimants is 0.87, implying that the value of their refund is 13 percentage points more 
than pension wealth accrued. These numbers mask substantial variation across age and tenure, 
however, which I discuss later. 
While PWCOR and NetPW provide estimates for the gap between one’s PW and refund 
evaluated at the quit point, they do not allow for inferences about teachers’ rationality. Decisions 
at the individual level are made according to one’s personal discount rate, among other factors.
63
 
One interpretation of PWCOR relates individuals’ time preferences to the assumption about the 
real rate of return. Teachers who cash out when PWCOR>1 reveal that their personal discount 
rate exceeds the assumed rate. One can also compare PWCOR and NetPW measures across 
teachers. For instance, a teacher who cashes out with a higher PWCOR (or higher NetPW) likely 
has a higher internal discount rate than teachers with lower PWCOR (NetPW) values. Thus, 
PWCOR and NetPW provide measures that relate teachers’ time preferences to the assumed 
discount rate. A lower assumed rate will increase PW, thereby increasing PWCOR and NetPW 
for individuals. This will have the effect of increasing the number of teachers with positive 
NetPW and vice versa. 
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 In the case of two-income households, retirement decisions are commonly made at the 
household level where spousal and family circumstances influence retirement decisions. 
Unfortunately, data on marriage status is not collected by ISBE or TRS to allow control for 
household factors. I acknowledge this limitation in the analysis. TRS provided information about 





Relative to annuitants, the average refund claimant starts teaching in Illinois about one 
year older and accrues about 0.7 fewer service credits. Although statistically significant, these 
differences are economically small. The average refund claimant also works in a slightly more 
challenging district characterized by a larger district enrollment and larger proportions of FRL 
and minority students. Again, these differences are significant but small. 
Table 8 breaks down the proportions of annuitants and refund claimants by positive and 
negative pension wealth under different real rate of return assumptions (2 percent, 4 percent, and 
6 percent).
64
 As expected, the number of teachers with positive NetPW decline as the assumed 
interest rate increases. For each interest rate shown, mean NetPW for refund claimants is 
considerably higher than mean NetPW for annuitants. Mean NetPW varies little across interest 
rates for positive NetPW separations, though it varies considerably for the negative NetPW 
group. The magnitude grows with the discount rate, increasing from about -$1,700 at a 2 percent 
discount rate assumption to about -$17,000 at a 6 percent discount rate. A higher discount rate 
decreases PW which subsequently increases the gap in the negative NetPW region (i.e. the region 
to the left of the crossover point in Figure 2). 
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 Table 8 and Table 9 are based on a sample that includes all classroom teachers hired since 
1980. This sample is larger than the one used for Table 6 and Table 7, which is based on 




Table 8: Cashout and deferral rates for teachers who separate with negative and positive 
net pension wealth under different real rate of return assumptions* 
    r=0.02 r=0.04 r=0.06 
    Cashouts Annuitants Cashouts Annuitants Cashouts Annuitants 
Net 
PW>0 
number 4,168 8,856 1,285 2,759 547 1,234 
rate 32.0% 68.0% 31.8% 68.2% 30.7% 69.3% 
mean NetPW $25,909 $40,043 $28,067 $49,836 $28,719 $54,483 
Net 
PW<0 
number 1,184 904 4,067 7,001 4,805 8,526 
rate 56.7% 43.3% 36.7% 63.3% 36.0% 64.0% 
mean NetPW -$1,692 -$1,501 -$9,124 -$9,183 -$15,019 -$16,696 
* Pension wealth values are reported in 2011 dollars. The sample includes all classroom teachers 
(n=15,112) who were hired since 1980 and includes separations at all ages until 2011. It excludes 
teachers who left TRS and continued covered work under a reciprocal Illinois pension system. 
Under the assumptions of 4 percent and 6 percent interest, Chi-square contingency tests 
(χ2=31.99 and χ2=19.52, resp.; 1 degree of freedom) reject the null hypothesis at α=0.01 that the 
decision to cash out is independent of whether NetPW is positive or negative. Thus, the test 
result lends evidence of a relationship between the benefit decision and NetPW. 
 
Economic theory predicts that teachers who separate from service with positive NetPW 
will choose to defer an annuity. Depending on assumptions about the discount rate, between 30.7 
percent and 32.0 percent of teachers who quit with positive pension wealth choose to cash out.
65
 
This finding lends itself to the annuity puzzle observed in many settings. On average, the value 
of NetPW is roughly $26,000 to $28,000 for refund claimants. On the other hand, I expect that 
teachers who quit with negative NetPW choose to cash out; yet, the data indicate that between 
43.3 and 64.0 percent of teachers who quit with negative NetPW opt to defer a pension 
(depending on the discount rate). These deferral rates are lower than those observed among 
vested public school teachers and other educational professionals in North Carolina, where about 
80 percent leave their refunds with the pension fund (Clark, Morrill, & Vandermeade, 2013). 
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 Numerous reasons might explain why individuals may choose to cash out. For example, an 
individual or household may be credit-constrained, perhaps for unexpected medical reasons or 
debt, or other shocks may occur in life requiring immediate financial resources. Alternatively, 




NetPW for this group in TRS is somewhat modest, however, ranging up to about -$17,000 under 
a 6 percent real interest. A perhaps more interesting story unfolds after breaking down these 
tradeoffs for different age groups. 
Table 9 breaks down NetPW by separation age and tenure groups and demonstrates the 
effect of backloading on the tradeoffs between benefit choices. Figure 4 provides a supplemental 
visual of this phenomenon by plotting NetPW against separation age (panel a) and YOS (panel 
b). Recall Figure 2, which graphs the PW accrual and refundable contributions over time for a 
stylistic teacher and clearly shows that the gap grows at an increasing rate at the back end of the 
teacher’s career. That is, the gap is increasing in YOS. The mean unadjusted NetPW for teachers 
who exit in their 20’s and 30’s (72 percent of refund claimants combined) is -$10,136 and -
$8,671, respectively. Mean NetPW increases to $12,538 for refund claimants leaving in their 
40’s (20 percent of refund claimants). For refund claimants separating at age 50 and after, or 8 
percent of refund claimants, the cost is large. This group forgoes on average $50,700 in PW by 
taking a refund. 
Almost all refund claimants leave TRS before reaching 20 YOS. Mean NetPW for the 16 
percent of refund claimants who leave with 10 to 15 YOS is $10,619.  Only 4 percent of refund 
claimants exit with longer service. Although teachers in this group comprise only a very small 
portion of refund claimants, they nonetheless opt for a benefit that is dwarfed by a deferred 







Table 9: NetPW by separation age and tenure groups* 
  Refund claimants (n=5,352) Annuitants (n=9,760) 
      (1) Unadjusted (2) Adjusted         
Age group n % mean sd mean sd n % mean sd 
age 20 to 29 1,116 21% -10,136 2,422 -6,783 3,260 1,548 16% -10,798 2,489 
age 30 to 39 2,754 51% -8,671 5,100 -3,647 7,077 5,433 56% -7,838 6,417 
age 40 to 49 1,074 20% 12,538 32,190 19,610 34,957 2,025 21% 32,622 68,879 
age 50 and up 408 8% 50,700 64,013 56,746 67,828 754 8% 88,125 129,092 
Tenure group   
  
        
  
  
5-10 YOS 4,327 81% -5,302 11,965 -1,037 12,546 6,743 69% -6,099 11,769 
10-15 YOS 830 16% 10,619 31,147 18,518 32,703 2,177 22% 10,231 31,745 
15-20 YOS 162 3% 33,556 39,828 45,959 41,212 612 6% 47,564 57,177 
20 and more 
YOS 
33 1% 231,789 130,809 250,684 137,154 228 2% 276,083 169,777 
* For refund claimants, panel (2) reports NetPW adjusted for taxes and penalties; pension wealth calculations are based on a 4 




Figure 4: Plots of net pension wealth on separation age and YOS 
    
(a) Exit age        
 
 






Table 10: Mean PWCOR, NetPW, and IROR by individual, professional, school, and district characteristics 
  REFUND CLAIMANTS ANNUITANTS 
  n PWCOR Net-PW IROR n PWCOR Net-PW IROR 
Full sample 1,624 0.87 -1,901 0.037 4,434 0.88 -366 0.037 
Separation age group                 
exit 20-29 346 0.46 -11,073 0.021 783 0.47 -11,113 0.022 
exit 30-39 880 0.65 -9,042 0.028 2,624 0.69 -8,293 0.029 
exit 40-49 261 1.27 10,064 0.049 728 1.36 17,116 0.052 
exit 50 and up 137 2.51 44,338 0.113 299 2.46 54,777 0.104 
YOS group                 
5-10 YOS 1,350 0.79 -4,884 0.034 1,350 0.79 -4,884 0.034 
10-15 YOS 248 1.23 10,256 0.050 248 1.23 10,256 0.050 
15-20 YOS 26 1.58 37,007 0.063 26 1.58 37,007 0.063 
Gender and race/ethnicity                 
Female 1,179 0.87 -1,784 0.037 3,777 0.87 -786 0.036 
Male 445 0.86 -2,211 0.037 657 0.93 2,051 0.038 
White 1,457 0.84 -2,737 0.036 4,172 0.87 -704 0.036 
Black 81 1.00 3,682 0.046 69 1.05 2,000 0.046 
Hispanic 69 1.28 8,782 0.051 120 1.30 12,153 0.051 
Asian, Pacific Islander, or Hawaiian 17 0.85 -223 0.036 71 0.77 -4,374 0.033 
School level                 
PK-8 986 0.85 -2,136 0.036 2,809 0.86 -1,202 0.036 
HS 410 0.84 -3,307 0.036 981 0.92 1,538 0.038 
SPED 228 1.00 1,645 0.043 644 0.91 379 0.039 
Endorsement area                 
art 111 0.82 -3,517 0.035 301 0.88 837 0.036 
ELA 351 0.88 -755 0.038 1,035 0.90 80 0.037 
foreign language 106 0.89 -93 0.038 290 0.87 -1,043 0.037 






Table 10: Mean PWCOR, NetPW, and IROR by individual, professional, school, and district characteristics (Cont.) 
  REFUND CLAIMANTS ANNUITANTS 
  n PWCOR Net-PW IROR n PWCOR Net-PW IROR 
social science 347 0.87 -1,759 0.038 982 0.86 -1,109 0.036 
vocational-related 35 0.96 299 0.043 104 0.93 1,435 0.039 
Post-secondary education                 
Graduate degree 210 1.08 4,347 0.047 594 1.15 9,882 0.047 
Bachelor's degree 1,412 0.83 -2,861 0.035 3,839 0.84 -1,955 0.035 
Degree from elite college in IL 1,521 0.88 -1,546 0.037 3,997 0.89 -26 0.037 
Degree not from elite college in IL 103 0.71 -7,150 0.030 437 0.79 -3,475 0.034 
out-of-state college 457 0.97 338 0.041 1,276 0.95 1,921 0.039 
in-state college 1,167 0.83 -2,778 0.035 3,158 0.85 -1,290 0.036 
Urbanicity                 
City 231 0.88 -1,168 0.038 632 0.90 -288 0.037 
Suburb 881 0.85 -2,631 0.036 2,657 0.85 -1,352 0.035 
Rural or town 512 0.89 -976 0.037 1,145 0.94 1,878 0.039 
Pension wealth calculations are based on 4 percent real rate of return, 2.5 percent inflation, and converted to 2011 dollars; all 




  Table 10 presents PWCOR, NetPW, and IROR means by subgroup for refund claimants 
and annuitants. For refund claimant groups with PWCOR values less than 1, average personal 
discount rates fall below 4 percent on average, and vice versa. As discussed above, NetPW is 
increasing in age and YOS (Figure 4). Similar patterns occur with PWCOR and IROR.
66
 Female 
teachers have a slightly higher PWCOR than male teachers while African American and 
Hispanic teachers have a significantly higher PWCOR than white and Asian teachers. Black and 
Hispanic teachers on average cash out when the present discounted value of their annuity is 
equal to 100 percent and 128 percent of the value of their refund claim. Special education 
teachers, teachers with a graduate degree, teachers who attended college out of state, and 
teachers who work in rural and city districts also exhibit higher PWCOR scores than their 
respective counterparts. 
I also include IROR as an alternative measure as it does not rely on assumptions for the 
interest rate. Among refund claimants, African American and Hispanic teachers display higher 
IROR values than white teachers. The rates for black and Hispanic teachers are about 1.0 and 1.5 
percentage points greater than white teachers, respectively. The average IROR for special 
education teachers is about 0.7 percentage points higher than PK-8 teachers. Teachers working in 
suburban districts have lower IRORs than teachers in rural and city districts, possibly reflecting 
higher salaries or more favorable credit markets in non-rural settings. Finally, the rate for 
teachers with a graduate degree is 1.2 percentage points higher than teachers with Bachelor’s 
degrees. This difference seems counterintuitive and contradicts findings in the literature, which 
finds discount rates decreasing in educational attainment. These statistics are merely descriptive, 
however, and likely do not capture other potentially important factors that might explain 
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differences across subgroups. For instance, individuals from high-income households may have a 
stronger tendency to obtain graduate degrees than individuals from lower-income households. 
Moreover, pension benefits are a function of salary and tenure, which are usually affected by 
teachers with graduate degrees.  
 
Summary 
About 36 percent of teachers opt to cash out their refundable contributions while 64 
percent defer an annuity. Descriptive statistics suggest lower annuity rates among male teachers, 
African American and Hispanic teachers, teachers with less post-secondary education, and 
teachers in rural settings. Thus, these teachers, on average, have higher internal discount rates. 
Overall, these observations parallel findings in other studies in the annuitization literature, 





Chapter 4: Results and Discussion 
This chapter begins by reporting and discussing results from the main behavioral models, 
which consist of logit regressions on teachers who separated before age 50. Because teachers 
who separate closer to retirement eligibility and choose to cash out are arguably unusual, I focus 
on the restricted sample. I also estimate models on the unrestricted sample for comparison. The 
key analytic controls include the pension-wealth-to-cash-out-ratio (PWCOR), net pension wealth 
(NetPW), and the internal rate of return (IROR) variables. By including them in the behavioral 
models, I am able to account for the complex interplay between tenure, age, and salary that 
occurs in determining financial incentives in the pension plan.  This chapter then supplements 
these results with model estimations based on samples not restricted by age and under different 
discount rates. It finishes by estimating the amount of money that members of the Illinois 
Teachers’ Retirement System (TRS) “leave on the table.” The choice variable in the behavioral 
models is the decision to cash out or leave one’s refundable contributions in the pension fund and 
is observed for each TRS member. Results for logit and probit regressions report marginal 
effects at the mean. Where appropriate, tables include a column for covariates’ means, where 





Table 11: Results for logistic regressions, separations under age 50  
(dependent variable = decision to claim refundable contributions) 
  mean (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Age At Separation 34.24 0.001 
   
  
(0.001) 
   Total Service 8.08 -0.021*** 
   
  
(0.003) 
   Salary, in ten thousands 2.92 -0.015 
   
  
(0.011) 




   
(0.018) 




    
(0.005) 
 IROR 0.03 
   
-2.955*** 
     
(0.536) 
after_2008 0.35 -0.018 -0.026** -0.026** -0.024* 
  
(0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Female 0.82 -0.162*** -0.148*** -0.148*** -0.144*** 
  
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Black 0.02 0.267*** 0.271*** 0.271*** 0.269*** 
  
(0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) 
Hispanic 0.03 0.066* 0.098** 0.089** 0.098** 
  
(0.039) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) 
Asian 0.01 -0.069 -0.066 -0.067 -0.067 
  
(0.045) (0.046) (0.045) (0.046) 
High school teacher 0.23 0.011 0.005 0.003 0.005 
  
(0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Special education teacher 0.14 0.000 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 
  
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Suburb 0.59 0.003 0.005 0.006 0.006 
  
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Rural or town 0.27 0.059** 0.066*** 0.067*** 0.066*** 
  
(0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Graduate Degree 0.12 0.006 0.023 0.019 0.023 
  
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Degree from elite IL college 0.09 -0.075*** -0.080*** -0.080*** -0.080*** 
  
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Degree from in-state 0.72 0.022 0.015 0.017 0.015 
  
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Art 0.07 -0.000 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 
  




Table 11: Results for logistic regressions, separations under age 50  
(dependent variable = decision to claim refundable contributions) (Cont.) 
  mean (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ELA 0.23 -0.016 -0.016 -0.016 -0.015 
  
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Foreign language 0.06 -0.001 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
  
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
Math or Science 0.13 -0.015 -0.015 -0.014 -0.015 
  
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Social Science 0.22 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
  
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Vocational 0.02 -0.036 -0.036 -0.035 -0.036 
  
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) 
Dist enrollment, in thousands 6.63 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Dist pupil-teacher ratio 16.22 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
  
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Dist IEP percent 0.16 0.014 0.023 0.018 0.032 
  
(0.191) (0.191) (0.191) (0.191) 
Dist FRL percent 0.32 0.039 0.046 0.044 0.048 
  
(0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) 
Dist minority percent 0.29 -0.011 -0.011 -0.010 -0.012 
  
(0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) 
      Assumed real interest rate 
 
-- 0.04 0.04 -- 
Observations 
 
5,622 5,622 5,622 5,622 
Pseudo R-squared 
 
0.0419 0.0350 0.0342 0.0355 
Log Lik   -3112 -3134 -3137 -3132 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Sample comprises TRS 
members hired in or after 1980 who quit in or after 2002 as a full-time teacher, and separations 
up to age 50; sample excludes teachers with a Single Sum Retirement benefit, individuals 
observed teaching in the City of Chicago PSD, and Inactive teachers who moved into a 
reciprocal Illinois pension system. Pension wealth is computed in 2011 dollars and based on 4 






Table 11 displays marginal effects of logit model estimations for the main sample, which 
includes teachers who separated up to age 50.
67
 Means for each variable are reported in the left-
hand side. All columns include individual, professional, school, and district factors. Column (1) 
includes controls for basic conditions that potentially affect retirement decisions, namely age, 
tenure, and salary and serves as the baseline model. The other columns correspond to models that 
control for PWCOR, NetPW, and IROR. These variables are discussed in detail in Chapter 3. 
Note that columns (1) and (4) do not include any measures of PW and, therefore, do not rely on 
an assumption about the interest rate. Results for models that control for PWCOR and NetPW are 
based on a 4 percent interest rate and 2.5 percent inflation.
68
 
Briefly reviewing a priori expectations, I anticipate that PWCOR, NetPW, and IROR will 
exhibit an inverse relationship with the propensity to cash out. An increase in benefits, and 
therefore increase in pension wealth, make cashing out less desirable than deferring. Higher 
values of PWCOR, NetPW, and IROR are indicative of higher benefits. Based on research about 
intertemporal time preferences, I expect teachers who are male, minority, have less education, 
and work in challenging districts and rural areas to exhibit higher rates of cashing out because 
these background characteristics are associated with higher discount rates. There are additional 
possible explanations for these expectations as well. Differences in risk preferences would make 
females less likely to cash out than males due to greater risk aversion. Given that lower-income 
individuals and minorities face less favorable terms in credit markets (Apgar & Calder, 2005), I 
expect that minority teachers will cash out at a higher rate than white teachers. In addition, I 
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 I also estimate probit and linear probability models. Results are very close to logit results and 
are included in Appendix C. 
68
 Wald test statistics fail to reject the null hypothesis that the estimated coefficients on 
endorsement variables are jointly equal to zero at the α=0.01 significance level. Their exclusion 




hypothesize that teaching in suburban districts is associated with a lower propensity to cash out 
than teaching in non-suburban districts because suburban households likely enjoy more favorable 
credit terms. Hard-to-staff districts, such as those with high proportions of ELL and FRL 
students, may also reflect areas with weak credit markets and subsequently work to increase the 
likelihood of teachers cashing out. Finally, teachers with more education (or higher quality 
education) will likely annuitize at higher rates than teachers who invest less in their education 
because of expected differences in levels of financial literacy. 
The sign on quit age in column (1) suggests a positive relationship with cashing out. The 
probability of cashing out increases by 0.1 percentage points if a teacher delays separation by 
one year, ceteris paribus. While the sign on this coefficient opposes expectations, it is not 
statistically significant at any conventional level. The coefficient on tenure, negative and 
statistically significant at the α=0.01 level, is consistent with expectations and implies that an 
additional year of work reduces the propensity to cash out by 2.1 percentage points. While an 
additional service credit implies increases for both pension wealth and refunds, the back-loading 
nature of defined benefit plans implies that the marginal increase in PW will be larger over later 
points in a teacher’s career. The coefficient on salary implies that increasing a teacher’s salary by 
$10,000 lowers the probability of cashing out by 1.5 percentage points, though it is not 
statistically significant. The expected direction for salary is ambiguous. On one hand, an increase 
in an individual’s salary will lower her propensity to cash out because it raises the value of her 
pension and, therefore, makes deferring more valuable. On the other hand, a positive coefficient 
on salary might suggest the presence of wealth effects. Wealthier individuals may be more 




PWCOR in column (2) is negative and statistically significant. Increasing this ratio by 
one (which implies doubling pension wealth) reduces the propensity to cash out by 9.5 
percentage points. The coefficient on NetPW in column (3) implies that a unit ($10,000) increase 
in NetPW lowers the probability of cashing out by 2.3 percentage points. This result supports 
expectations that increasing PW, holding refundable contributions constant, makes an annuity 
more desirable for teachers and reduces the propensity to cash out. Alternatively, increasing 
refundable contributions will lower PWCOR, thereby raising the likelihood of cashing out. 
Finally, the coefficient on IROR is negative and significant. An increase in the break-even 
discount rate (the rate that equalizes the lump-sum refund with the present discounted value of 
the stream of lifetime annuity payments) by 1 percentage point lowers the propensity to cash out 
by 2.8 percentage points. 
Because total service largely determines the value of pension benefits, its coefficient in 
column (1) appears to provide the same explanation as PWCOR, NetPW, and IROR, and its 
model fits the data a bit better than models in columns (2) through (4). When total service is 
included in the models with the key control variables, it remains statistically significant while 
PWCOR, NetPW, and IROR each become statistically insignificant. Controlling for PWCOR, 
NetPW, and IROR, however, affords an economic interpretation about the tradeoffs related to 
distribution choices whereas total service does not. 
The sizes of coefficients on demographic characteristics across columns are remarkably 
consistent. Female teachers are 14.4 to 16.2 percent less likely to cash out than male teachers, 
holding other covariates constant. This is likely due to men having higher discount rates and falls 






 Men tend to be dominant earners in two-income households (Winkler & Rose, 2001) 
and therefore may seek greater control over retirement savings by cashing out. Alternatively, 
gender differences may reflect variation in risk preferences. Given that women reveal more risk 
aversion than men with their investment choices (Bajtelsmit, Bernasek, & Jianakoplos, 1999; 
Gerrans & Clark-Murphy, 2004), female teachers may view an annuity as the safer choice. 
Black teachers are about 27 percentage points more likely to cash out than white teachers. 
The higher probability to cash out may reflect differential credit access and possibly 
discrimination against minorities (Duca & Rosenthal, 1993). Teachers without access to credit 
and teachers who face less favorable credit terms will seek capital elsewhere, possibly in 
retirement savings. Positive coefficients on Hispanic ethnicity comport with the explanation of 
credit constraint and suggest that Hispanic teachers are 6.6 to 9.8 percentage points more likely 
than white teachers to cash out. 
The coefficients for graduate degree are statistically insignificant, implying that the data 
are insufficient to detect any difference. The estimates for elite IL college, however, are 
significant and in the expected direction. Teachers who graduated from a top-50 nationally 
ranked university in Illinois are 7.5 to 8.0 percentage points less likely to cash out than teachers 
who did not graduate from an elite IL school.
70
 Admittedly, this measure is noisy because the 
data do not include information about attendance at specific out-of-state institutions (28 percent 
of the sample). Nonetheless, it conveys information that supports previous research which 
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 Clark, Morrill, and Vanderweide (2013), for instance, find that male public employees in 
North Carolina are about 10 to 12 percent more likely to cash out their contributions. 
70
 Illinois universities listed in the Top 50 "National University Rankings" are the University of 
Chicago, Northwestern University, and the University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign. Illinois 
universities with Graduate Education Schools listed in the Top 50 are Northwestern University, 




largely finds a negative relationship between the likelihood of cashing out and an individual’s 
investment in education. Education, in turn, may correlate with financial literacy, which plays an 
important role in retirement planning and behavior (e.g. Lusardi & Mitchell, 2006; Lusardi & 
Mitchell, 2007). Students at elite colleges in Illinois may be more likely to take classes that boost 
financial literacy, though this notion is only speculative. If individuals do not understand the 
tradeoffs they face with certain decisions, then their choice may reflect a misconception rather 
than their true preferences. Teachers receive annual benefit statements that report information 
about their accounts, including cumulative refundable contributions and estimated retirement 
benefits they would receive if they separate that year.  Appendix B displays a redacted copy of a 
full report sent annually to TRS members and shows that estimated benefits are given in monthly 
annuity amounts. These reported pension benefits are not directly comparable to the value of 
teachers’ refundable contributions, which are reported as a lump sum. Teachers, however, may 




The likelihood of cashing out by teachers who work in rural or town districts is between 
5.9 and 6.7 percentage points higher than teachers working in a city district. Teachers in rural 
settings may, on average, have higher discount rates. This finding may also reflect individuals in 
rural areas having less access to favorable loan terms. The coefficients on district enrollment are 
positive across specifications and statistically significant. The expected increase in the propensity 
to cash out from increasing district enrollment by one thousand students is 0.3 percentage point. 
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 Teachers, for example, may make different retirement decisions about cashing out if TRS 
reported the present discounted value of members’ pension payments, which can be compared to 




Though statistically significant, the magnitude of this estimate is quite small. The estimates on 
other district-level variables are statistically insignificant. 
I finally account for the recession in 2008 by including a variable that controls for 
separation from service that occurs during FY 2009 onward. The financial crisis changed 
financial circumstances for many people and households. It also arguably altered people’s 
attitudes about the financial markets. Thus, the recession likely changed people’s preferences for 
certain benefit distributions. There may be at least two effects from the recession. On one hand, 
the recession dampened people’s financial standings, increasing the pool of financially 
constrained individuals or households and thereby increasing the demand for liquidity. This 
effect would increase the propensity for cashing out because more teachers would require 
financial resources in the near term. On the other hand, the recession may have altered people’s 
perceptions about the financial markets and dampened tolerance for risk. In this sense, teachers 
may view a deferred lifetime annuity in a more favorable light than cashing out. In other words, 
teachers post-recession likely view rolling over their refunds into retirement savings as a riskier 
prospect than if they made the decision before the recession. This effect would subsequently 
lower the probability of cashing out. The sign on the coefficient is negative and significant, 
suggesting that the latter effect is stronger. Teachers who separated after 2008 were about 2.6 









Teachers who separate at or a few years away from retirement eligibility and choose to 
take a refund disbursement instead of annuitizing likely make these choices based on highly 
unusual circumstances. Therefore, I originally exclude teachers who quit from age 50 from the 
sample. Below, I report results for samples that do not restrict separation ages. I then estimate 
models under different discount rate assumptions of 2 percent and 6 percent.  
Sample with all separation ages 
 Table 12 provides estimates from logit regressions based on a sample not restricted by 
quit age. The estimates on age, service, and salary barely change while the slopes for PWCOR, 
NetPW, and IROR decline significantly. The estimate on IROR becomes statistically 
insignificant. These differences are not surprising given that logit models are highly nonlinear. 
Because slope estimates depend on the sample means of the covariates, changing the sample may 
change the means and, subsequently, change the slope estimates. Estimates on demographic-
specific covariates, on the other hand, remain largely unchanged. This is not surprising given that 
covariate means for the two samples are very similar. Including teachers of all separation ages in 






Table 12: Results for logistic regressions, all separation ages 
(dependent variable = decision to claim refundable contributions) 
  mean (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Age At Separation 35.62 0.002** 
   
  
(0.001) 
   Total Service 8.14 -0.022*** 
   
  
(0.002) 
   Salary, in ten thousands 2.93 -0.009 
   
  
(0.011) 




   
(0.010) 




    
(0.003) 
 IROR 0.04 
   
-0.158 
     
(0.232) 
after_2008 0.36 -0.028** -0.036*** -0.034*** -0.037*** 
  
(0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Female 0.82 -0.159*** -0.150*** -0.151*** -0.151*** 
  
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Black 0.02 0.256*** 0.272*** 0.272*** 0.270*** 
  
(0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) 
Hispanic 0.03 0.060* 0.077** 0.080** 0.072** 
  
(0.036) (0.037) (0.037) (0.036) 
Asian 0.01 -0.052 -0.050 -0.050 -0.050 
  
(0.046) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) 
High school teacher 0.23 0.010 0.004 0.004 0.004 
  
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Special education teacher 0.14 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.004 
  
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Suburb 0.58 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.003 
  
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Rural or town 0.27 0.063*** 0.069*** 0.069*** 0.068*** 
  
(0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Graduate Degree 0.13 -0.011 0.005 0.008 0.002 
  
(0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Degree from elite IL college 0.09 -0.075*** -0.079*** -0.080*** -0.078*** 
  
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Degree from in-state 0.71 0.022* 0.015 0.015 0.016 
  
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Art 0.07 -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
  




Table 12: Results for logistic regressions, all separation ages 
(dependent variable = decision to claim refundable contributions) (Cont.) 
  mean (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ELA 0.23 -0.018 -0.018 -0.017 -0.018 
  
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Foreign language 0.07 0.002 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
  
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Math or Science 0.13 -0.013 -0.011 -0.011 -0.010 
  
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Social Science 0.22 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 
  
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Vocational 0.02 -0.027 -0.025 -0.025 -0.026 
  
(0.036) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) 
Dist enrollment, in thousands 6.68 0.002** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Dist pupil-teacher ratio 16.25 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Dist IEP percent 0.16 -0.016 -0.011 -0.011 -0.014 
  
(0.183) (0.184) (0.184) (0.184) 
Dist FRL percent 0.32 0.053 0.044 0.048 0.040 
  
(0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) 
Dist minority percent 0.29 -0.012 0.002 -0.001 0.004 
  
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) 
      Assumed real interest rate 
 
-- 0.04 0.04 -- 
Observations 
 
6,058 6,058 6,058 6,058 
Pseudo R-squared 
 
0.0450 0.0328 0.0336 0.0324 
Log Lik   -3363 -3406 -3403 -3408 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Sample comprises TRS 
members hired in or after 1980 who quit in or after 2002 as a full-time teacher, and all  quit 
ages; sample excludes teachers with a Single Sum Retirement benefit, individuals observed 
teaching in the City of Chicago PSD, and Inactive teachers who moved into a reciprocal Illinois 
pension system. Pension wealth is computed in 2011 dollars and based on 4 percent real 






Results under different discount rates 
 I also estimate behavioral models under different discount rate assumptions. Table 13 
reports results for models under 2 percent and 6 percent discount rates. These models control for 
PWCOR and NetPW and correspond to columns (2) and (3) in Table 11. Changing the discount 
rate will change pension wealth, which in turn impacts the PWCOR and NetPW variables. 
Specifically, a lower discount rate implies higher PWCOR and NetPW and would act to lower the 
propensity to cash out, and vice versa. This pattern is evident in Table 13. Under a risk-free 
discount rate of 2 percent, a unit increase in PWCOR lowers the likelihood to cash out by 7.4 
percentage points. Under a 6 percent real interest rate assumption, the probability of cashing out 
decreases by 12.6 percentage points. The propensity to cash out under a 4 percent discount rate 
falls in between these two estimates, though NetPW does not. Under a 2 percent discount rate, a 
unit increase in NetPW lowers the probability to cash out by 1.9 percent. The estimate becomes 
statistically insignificant with a 6 percent assumption. 
The predictive probabilities for teachers’ background and district factors vary little under 
different discount rates. For example, female teachers are between 14.0 and 15.1 percent less 
likely to cash out than male teachers under different assumed interest rates. Black teachers are 
26.3 to 27.5 percentage points more likely to cash out. The predictive probability for teachers 
with a degree from an elite Illinois institution is about 8 percentage points less than their 




only slightly under different discount rate assumptions. Overall, behavioral results are consistent 




Table 13: Results for logistic regressions under different interest rates, separations under 
age 50 (dependent variable = decision to claim refundable contributions) 
Assumed real interest rate 2% 2% 2% 6% 6% 6% 
  mean (1) (2) mean (3) (4) 
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 Results are similar under 2 and 6 percent discount rates for the sample not restricted by 




Table 13: Results for logistic regressions under different interest rates, separations under 
age 50 (dependent variable = decision to claim refundable contributions) (Cont.) 
Assumed real interest rate 2% 2% 2% 6% 6% 6% 
  mean (1) (2) mean (3) (4) 
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-3131 -3122   -3136 -3148 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Sample comprises TRS 
members hired in or after 1980 who quit in or after 2002 as a full-time teacher, and separations 
up to age 50; sample excludes teachers with a Single Sum Retirement benefit, individuals 
observed teaching in the City of Chicago PSD, and Inactive teachers who moved into a 
reciprocal Illinois pension system. Pension wealth is computed in 2011 dollars and based on 4 






Leakage in TRS 
 Lastly, I estimate the amount of leakage that both refund claimants and the group of 
inactive members who leave their contribution in the fund incur in TRS. I define leakage for 
refund claimants as simply NetPW when separation occurs at a point in their career when the 
value of their pension wealth accrued outweighs their refundable contributions. It occurs among 
annuitants when the value of one’s refundable contributions outweighs the present discounted 
value of the pension they choose to receive, both evaluated at the point of separation. To obtain 
estimates, I first compute NetPW for all refund claimants and annuitants in TRS, including non-
teachers, hired since 1980. Then I sum NetPW for all vested refund claimants (annuitants) who 
separate at a point such that NetPW>0 (NetPW<0). Table 14 and Table 15 report leakage that 
refund claimants and annuitants incur, respectively, for all members and for classroom teachers 
only. Estimates rely on assumptions where the real discount rate is 4 percent and inflation is 2.5 
percent. The table for refund claimants also reports values that adjust for taxes and penalties 
associated with not rolling over refunds and withdrawing before age 59.5 without a roll over. 
The unadjusted amount reflects leakage that implicitly stays in the state’s TRS pension fund 
while the adjusted amount reflects total leakage actually experienced by refund claimants. 
Because I do not know if an annuitant would roll over a refund if she cashes out instead, I do not 
make any assumptions about rollovers for this group and, therefore, do not make any 
adjustments. 
Since 1980, 1,913 refund claimants quit after vesting in the plan and separated with 
positive NetPW. The aggregate value of leakage for these members is $55.2 million ($69.1 
million in adjusted terms). Members who quit since 2000 experienced the largest share of this 




the system, or $35.4 million ($44.6 million in adjusted terms). Again, teachers incur most of this 
leakage since 2000, worth $38.1 million after adjusting for withholdings (or 85 percent of 
leakage since 1980).  
Expressing leakage in amounts per refund claimant add perspective. In unadjusted terms, 
leakage equals $28,865 per member since 1980 and over $34,000 per member since 2000. After 
adjusting for tax withholdings and early distribution penalties, TRS members experienced 
$36,000 in leakage since 1980 and over $42,800 since 2000. The corresponding amounts for 
classroom teachers are similar. 
The aggregate value of leakage for all annuitants is $89.8 million since 1980 and $71.0 
million since 2000. Among annuitants, the level of per capita leakage is substantially lower, 
primarily due to about 65 percent of this group separating with less than 10 years of service (and 
therefore low levels of benefits in terms of pension wealth). The average amount of leakage for 
all groups in Table 15 is about $9,000. Because of the backloading nature of the FAS DB plan, 
refund claimants experience substantially greater amounts of leakage.
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The overall savings by the state from this leakage is miniscule relative to its total 
unfunded liabilities. By its own estimates, TRS’s unfunded liabilities as of June 30, 2013 are 
$55.7 billion. Total leakage by members since 1980 as a percentage of this debt, however, is only 
0.2 percent. Thus, although the savings realized from leakage by its members are very small, 
leakage among some members are substantial, particularly among refund claimants. 
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 Please note that these estimates of leakage reflect the value of pension only and do not include 
the value of retiree health insurance (RHI), which is accessible to annuitants and relinquished by 
refund claimants. Incorporating RHI into the calculus will have the effect of enlarging the group 




Table 14: Aggregate NetPW by refund claimants with positive NetPW 
    Unadjusted Adjusted for tax, penalties 
  Number total per member total per member 
All members 
     1980 to 2013 1,913 $55,217,808  $28,865  $69,096,880  $36,120  
2000 to 2013 1,349 $46,664,952  $34,592  $57,773,704  $42,827  
Teachers only 
     1980 to 2013 1,266 $35,386,172  $27,951  $44,599,448  $35,229  
2000 to 2013 927 $30,472,650  $32,872  $38,101,556  $41,102  
NOTE: samples exclude refund claimants hired before 1980 and non-vested members; PW is 
computed assuming a 4 percent real interest rate, 2.5 percent inflation, and is expressed in 2011 
dollars; adjusted estimates reflect a 20 percent withholding on members who do not roll over 
their refunds and 10 percent federal penalty levied on members who take a refund disbursement 
prior to age 59.5 without rolling them over 
 
 
Table 15: Aggregate NetPW by annuitants with negative NetPW 
  Number total per member 
All members 
   1980 to 2013 9,864 $89,771,536  $9,100 
2000 to 2013 7,742 $70,986,272  $9,168 
Teachers only 
   1980 to 2013 7,036 $65,323,496  $9,284 
2000 to 2013 5,598 $52,340,428  $9,349 
NOTE: samples exclude annuitants hired before 1980; PW is computed assuming a 4 percent 
real interest rate and expressed in 2011 dollars; adjusted estimates reflect a 20 percent 
withholding on members who do not roll over their refunds and 10 percent federal penalty 







 This chapter presents results for behavioral models that estimate the propensity of 
teachers to cash out along observable characteristics. Results parallel findings in the general 
retirement literature that examines retirement behavior in different public sector settings. 
Overall, teachers that are male, Black, Hispanic, have a degree from a non-elite school in IL or 
out of state institution, and who teach in rural areas exhibit higher predictive probabilities for 
cashing out than their counterparts. Additionally, teachers who quit after the 2008 recession 
exhibit a lower probability to cash out than teachers who quit before the recession. I find no 
relationship between subject endorsements and cashout decisions. These findings are consistent 
across models based on different discount rate assumptions. 
 The chapter concludes with an estimate of the aggregate leakage that occurs among TRS 
members who take a refund claim and members who choose instead to leave their funds in the 
stewardship of the system. I define leakage as NetPW for refund claimants who quit when the 
value of their pension wealth outweighs their refundable contributions, and vice versa for 
annuitants. Leakage that refund claimants experienced since 1980, adjusted for taxes and 
penalties, amounted to $36,120 per refund claimant among all members. Over four-fifths of this 
leakage, however, occurred since 2000. Each annuitant, on the other hand, incurred about 
$9,000. 
Relative to the overall fiscal health of TRS, total leakage by members since 1980 as a 
percentage of pension debt is 0.2 percent. Thus, while the mean leakage per member among 




savings to the pension fund realized from leakage are very small. The next and final chapter 






Chapter 5: Conclusion 
To my knowledge, this dissertation is the first analysis that documents pension benefit 
choices made by public school teachers as a standalone group. While the literature on teacher 
pensions has ventured into numerous areas of policy import, it has yet to examine teachers’ 
choices that pertain to benefit distributions. A body of research on distribution choice exists in 
the general retirement literature, however, and point to an “annuity puzzle.” Although theory 
predicts high rates of annuitization, substantial variation occurs in actual take-up. This puzzle is 
borne out in the Illinois retirement data, where 36 percent of classroom teachers in TRS choose 
to withdraw their refundable contributions. This paper analyzes benefit distribution choices by 
public school teachers enrolled in the Illinois Teachers’ Retirement System (TRS), where they 
make decisions between taking a lump-sum withdrawal of their refundable contributions and 
deferring a pension benefit until reaching retirement eligibility, thereby leaving their 
contributions in the pension fund. 
Illinois provides an interesting case because, like most states, teachers enroll in a “final 
salary” defined benefit (FAS DB) plan, and those who opt to receive a refund do not collect the 
employer’s portion of contributions to the pension fund. Unlike most states, however, teachers 
collect less than their cumulative contributions (TRS withholds one percent of earnings for 
survivor benefits, which refund claimants are ineligible for). Moreover, Illinois does not credit 
interest on teachers’ refundable contributions. Thus, refund claimants receive less money than if 
they initially did not contribute anything to TRS and instead deposited their money in a savings 
account. Finally, while the provisions that govern public FAS DB plans like Illinois’s vary across 




this analysis arguably generalize to a wider set of public retirement systems. Because refund 
rules in Illinois are less favorable for teachers than any other state, the 36 percent refund 
withdrawal rate in Illinois arguably sets a lower bound estimate for potential cashout rates in 
other states. This analysis aims to answer two research questions: 
1. To what extent do vested teachers enrolled in TRS separate from service with positive 
pension wealth, and how much money is “left on the table” at a conventional discount 
rate? 
2. As indicated by cashout patterns, what types of teachers display higher or lower discount 
rates? 
The idiosyncratic, highly nonlinear financial incentives common in FAS DB plans play 
an important role in benefit decisions and provide a key component in the analysis. To control 
for the relative attractiveness between choices, this analysis employs three central measures: the 
pension-wealth-to-cash-out-ratio (PWCOR), net pension wealth (NetPW), and the internal rate of 
return (IROR) variables. I include these controls in a series of behavioral models that estimate the 
propensity of teachers to cash out along observable characteristics.  
Behavioral results parallel findings in the general retirement literature that examines 
retirement behavior in different public sector settings. Overall, this analysis finds higher cashout 
rates among male, African American, and Hispanic teachers; teachers who work in rural 
districts; and teachers who did not receive a degree from an elite institution in Illinois. These 
results are indicative of higher discount rates among these groups and comport with the 




cashout decisions. These findings are consistent across models that assume different discount 
rates. 
 The analysis concludes with an estimate of the aggregate leakage that occurs among TRS 
members who take a refund claim. Leakage is defined as NetPW for refund claimants who quit 
when the value of their pension wealth outweighs their refundable contributions. Leakage that 
refund claimants experience since 1980, adjusted for taxes and penalties, amounted to $36,120 
per refund claimant among all members and $35,229 per refund claimant among classroom 
teachers. Over four-fifths of this leakage, however, occurred since 2000. Each annuitant, on the 
other hand, incurs about $9,000. Relative to the overall fiscal health of TRS, total leakage by 
members since 1980 as a percentage of pension debt is 0.2 percent. Thus, while the mean 
leakage per member among refund claimants with positive NetPW and annuitants with negative 
NetPW are substantial, the savings to the pension fund realized from leakage are very small. The 
findings in this analysis suggest a set of policy implications, both for retirement security and for 
how some teachers value their retirement benefits. 
 
Policy Implications 
Retirement security poses a major concern not only for individuals and households, but 
for societies at large which may face concerns about poverty among the elderly (Smeeding & 
Sandstrom, 2004). Leakage of funds from retirement savings for other uses such as hardship, 
paying off debt, or consumption poses a potential threat to retirement security. This analysis 
finds large potential for leakage among classroom teachers in TRS. Teachers who leave prior to 




rather than collecting a deferred annuity face potentially large capital losses. First, taking a 
refund means that the teacher will receive less than her cumulative contributions. Second, by 
taking a lower distribution, teachers will forgo possibly large amounts of accrued interest that 
could have accumulated in an investment or retirement account. To exacerbate matters, 80 
percent of all refund claimants in TRS hired since 1980 did not elect to arrange a rollover of any 
portion of their refunds with TRS. Thus, arguably most of these members collect an even much 
lower refund benefit because public retirement systems by law withhold 20 percent of the claim 
amount for taxes, and refund claimants also face a 10 percent early distribution penalty if their 
withdrawal occurs before age 59½ without a roll over. Consequently, it is likely that refund 
rules, coupled with early distribution penalties, increases the prospect for drawing down 
retirement funds too fast (and possibly outliving one’s retirement savings). 
Mobile and young public employees in FAS DB plans who do not stay in a system for an 
entire career are particularly disadvantaged by these plans (Costrell & Podgursky, 2010). First, 
FAS DB plans lack portability, meaning that teachers who leave one system cannot take their 
retirement accounts with them. Second, FAS DB plans are “backloaded,” meaning that pension 
wealth accrues non-linearly and increasingly rapidly from about mid-career. Thus, a teacher who 
leaves before reaching retirement eligibility stands to lose out on a substantial amount of pension 
wealth (potentially more than half of one’s accrued pension wealth worth tens of thousands or 
even hundreds of thousands of dollars). Refund claimants stand to lose even more. Third, most 
public plans do not include employer’s contributions in refunds. This is far different from the 
private sector, where law requires that refund distributions equal or exceed the present 
discounted value of the annuity benefit. Fourth, many states that have public FAS DB plans face 




reducing pension debt, they are less likely to make changes favorable for short-termers. Benefit 
enhancements for this group without commensurate decreases in benefits for full-term 
employees are difficult, especially when some states consider benefit reductions unconstitutional. 
Rather, recent pension reforms have trended towards increasing retirement ages and vesting 
requirements that apply to new hires only. Such reforms make matters worse for mobile 
employees in particular. 
 
Options for policy reform 
Findings in this analysis point to the lack of fairness towards all teachers who enroll in 
FAS DB plans. The exclusion of employer contributions from refund withdrawals, plus 
withholding of interest and the one percent survivor benefit contribution, levies a substantial cost 
on most teachers who choose this benefit. Moreover, leakage in retirement funds raises concerns 
about retirement security. At a basic level, policy changes could address a few shortcomings 
inherent in FAS DB plans that systematically disadvantage mobile teachers. Pension policy can 
implement at least three reforms to increase the fairness of pension plans for all teachers. 
1. To encourage more refund claimants to roll over their distributions, pension funds can 
take advantage of the power of defaults. Policy could require workers to designate or 
establish a retirement account for automatic roll over of refunds when they start working. 
Of course, individuals can choose to withdraw these funds according to their own 
circumstances (e.g. financial hardship), but the consequences associated with 
withdrawing can be severe. Policy should also ensure that these individuals are clearly 




the future. In Illinois, public employees must designate beneficiaries on day one – a box 
could be added that requires designation of a retirement account where disbursements are 
automatically rolled over in the case a teacher separates and files a refund claim.  
2. Policy can increase transparency by requiring pension funds to report information on 
benefit statements that allows teachers to compare the value of a refund distribution with 
the present value of the annuity they would collect conditional on various separation 
points. 
3. Policy could come in line with regulations in the private sector by requiring lump sum 
refunds to equal or exceed the present value of the present discounted value of their 
annuity. 
While these policy changes might address the inherent unfairness in FAS DB plans, they amount 
merely to tinkering around the edges and will not address other pressing issues such as 
underfunding that face public plans all over the nation. It is well known, for instance, that 
peculiar political incentives led to the mismanagement and underfunding of these plans (McGee, 
no date). In addition, these reforms will likely increase the system’s liabilities by virtue of 
increasing the number of members who leave with positive NetPW and choose to annuitize. 
Moreover, this analysis, combined with growing evidence from other research (e.g. Fitzpatrick, 
2012; Aldeman & Rotherham, 2014; Goldhaber & Grout, 2014b), implies that some teachers 
may not value FAS DB benefits as much as their counterparts who opt to leave their 
contributions in the pension fund. To address these issues, large-scale systemic change is 
indicated. 
Alternative plans such as cash balance (CB) plans and defined contribution (DC) plans 




pension wealth, portability, and spreading financial risk across both employers and employees 
arguably make CB plans particularly appealing to today’s workforce. Figure D.1 in Appendix D 
illustrates a hypothetical CB plan (dotted line) and replicates the tradeoffs between benefit 
choices for a stylistic Tier 1 teacher illustrated in Figure 2 (Chapter 1). The solid line represents 
pension wealth accrual and the dashed line represents refundable contributions. Under the CB 
plan, this teacher is allowed to collect her contributions, including the one percent survivor 
contribution and interest, along with an employer match (5 percent) and an annual interest credit 
set at 5 percent applied to her notional CB account. The benefit under the CB plan accrues in a 
smooth manner and exceeds the FAS DB benefit until about mid-career. Unlike the FAS DB 
plan, under which pension wealth accrual spikes at arbitrary points in a career and eventually 
declines, benefits under CB plans accrue smoothly and continuously. For refund claimants in 
particular, the CB plan can offer more favorable benefits at all separation points. Importantly, 
portability allows the CB plan to offer a reasonable level of benefits that teachers who leave the 
system before retirement eligibility can take with them. Clearly, this alternative is more 
favorable for mobile teachers and career-switchers (e.g. the engineer with a desire to switch over 
and teach high school math). 
This analysis focuses on decisions made by teachers under Tier 1 because all teachers 
enrolled in the current Tier 2 plan have not vested yet. Because TRS discontinued Tier 1 after 
2010, I briefly extend the above discussion to Tier 2. Figure D.2 replicates Figure D.1 for Tier 2. 
This teacher’s refundable contributions exceed her pension wealth until age 58. Thus, up to this 
point under the current plan, she is better off taking a refund than deferring. Again, because the 
refund she receives does not include interest and excludes one percent of her earnings, she is left 




CB plan, her notional account would include both her contributions and the employer 
contributions, plus interest. This plan offers a promising alternative that is more fair and 
palatable for today’s teaching workforce, especially young and mobile teachers. 
 
Summary 
Despite the heavy backloading in FAS DB plans arguably intended to recruit and retain 
workers until arbitrary ages set for early and normal retirement, a healthy portion of teachers in 
Illinois elect to leave the system prior to reaching these ages. Three-quarters of teachers in TRS 
leave before accumulating five years of service. Of vested teachers who separate from TRS 
before reaching retirement eligibility, 36 percent opt to take a refund of their contributions 
despite collecting less than the amount they originally contributed to the pension fund. Male 
teachers, minority teachers, teachers in rural districts, and teachers without a degree from an elite 
Illinois institution are more likely to cash out than their respective counterparts and indicate 
higher discount rates among these groups than their counterparts. While policy changes to the 
DB system itself may address some of the issues associated with disadvantaging young and 
mobile teachers, such changes do not address other pressing issues that face public retirement 
systems. Large-scale reforms, such as offering optional CB or DC plans, may address these 
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Appendix A: Supplemental Table and Figures 
 
Table A.1: Distribution of NetPW for TRS classroom teacher refund claimants under 
different discount rates 
  Unadjusted for tax Adjusted for tax 
Net pension wealth 2 percent 4 percent 6 percent 2 percent 4 percent 6 percent 
Less than $0 22.1% 76.0% 89.8% 7.1% 65.0% 84.2% 
$0 to $10,000 38.1% 9.9% 4.3% 41.0% 15.4% 7.3% 
$10,000 to $20,000 13.2% 4.8% 1.8% 19.2% 7.0% 3.2% 
$20,000 to $30,000 6.8% 2.8% 1.6% 9.1% 3.8% 1.9% 
$30,000 to $40,000 5.1% 1.9% 0.6% 5.7% 2.8% 1.0% 
$40,000 to $50,000 3.0% 1.3% 0.5% 3.9% 1.7% 0.5% 
More than $50,000 11.6% 3.3% 1.6% 13.9% 4.2% 1.9% 
Notes: NetPW values are reported in 2011 dollars and based on gender- and race-specific 
survival probabilities from the CDC's 2007 Life Tables; statistics are based on a sample that 
includes all classroom teachers hired in or after 1980, all separation ages, and individuals who 
vested in the system; it excludes teachers who left TRS and continued work in another Illinois 








Figure A.1: Fitted scatterplot of PWCOR on YOS 
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Appendix C: Ancillary behavioral model results 
Table C.1: Results for probit regressions, separations under age 50 
(dependent variable = decision to claim refundable contributions) 
  mean (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Age At Separation 34.24 0.001 
   
  
(0.001) 
   Total Service 8.08 -0.020*** 
   
  
(0.003) 
   Salary, in ten thousands 2.92 -0.016 
   
  
(0.011) 




   
(0.018) 




    
(0.005) 
 IROR 0.03 
   
-2.891*** 
     
(0.523) 
after_2008 0.35 -0.017 -0.025* -0.026** -0.024* 
  
(0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Female 0.82 -0.161*** -0.148*** -0.148*** -0.144*** 
  
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Black 0.02 0.266*** 0.270*** 0.270*** 0.268*** 
  
(0.048) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) 
Hispanic 0.03 0.067* 0.097** 0.088** 0.097** 
  
(0.039) (0.041) (0.040) (0.041) 
Asian 0.01 -0.071 -0.069 -0.070 -0.070 
  
(0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) 
High school teacher 0.23 0.012 0.005 0.004 0.006 
  
(0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Special education teacher 0.14 0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 
  
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Suburb 0.59 0.002 0.005 0.005 0.005 
  
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Rural or town 0.27 0.058** 0.066*** 0.067*** 0.066*** 
  
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Graduate Degree 0.12 0.006 0.022 0.019 0.023 
  
(0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Degree from elite IL college 0.09 -0.075*** -0.080*** -0.080*** -0.081*** 
  
(0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Degree from in-state 0.72 0.021 0.015 0.017 0.015 
  




Table C.1: Results for probit regressions, separations under age 50 
(dependent variable = decision to claim refundable contributions) (Cont.) 
  mean (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Art 0.07 -0.002 -0.004 -0.002 -0.004 
  
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
ELA 0.23 -0.017 -0.016 -0.016 -0.016 
  
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Foreign language 0.06 -0.002 -0.006 -0.005 -0.006 
  
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
Math or Science 0.13 -0.016 -0.016 -0.015 -0.017 
  
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Social Science 0.22 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
  
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Vocational 0.02 -0.033 -0.036 -0.035 -0.036 
  
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) 
Dist enrollment, in thousands 6.63 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 
  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Dist pupil-teacher ratio 16.22 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
  
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Dist IEP percent 0.16 0.010 0.017 0.010 0.027 
  
(0.191) (0.191) (0.191) (0.191) 
Dist FRL percent 0.32 0.036 0.046 0.044 0.048 
  
(0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) 
Dist minority percent 0.29 -0.009 -0.011 -0.011 -0.012 
  
(0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) 
      Assumed real interest rate 
 
-- 0.04 0.04 -- 
Observations 
 
5,622 5,622 5,622 5,622 
Pseudo R-squared 
 
0.0418 0.0350 0.0342 0.0355 
Log Lik   -3112 -3134 -3137 -3133 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Sample comprises TRS 
members hired in or after 1980 who quit in or after 2002 as a full-time teacher, and separations 
up to age 50; sample excludes teachers with a Single Sum Retirement benefit, individuals 
observed teaching in the City of Chicago PSD, and Inactive teachers who moved into a 
reciprocal Illinois pension system. Pension wealth is computed in 2011 dollars and based on 4 






Table C.2: Results for linear probability model regressions, separations under age 50 
(dependent variable = decision to claim refundable contributions) 
  mean (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Age At Separation 34.24 0.001 
   
  
(0.001) 
   Total Service 8.08 -0.019*** 
   
  
(0.003) 
   Salary, in ten thousands 2.92 -0.015 
   
  
(0.011) 




   
(0.016) 




    
(0.004) 
 IROR 0.03 
   
-2.759*** 
     
(0.491) 
after_2008 0.35 -0.017 -0.025** -0.026** -0.023* 
  
(0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Female 0.82 -0.159*** -0.148*** -0.150*** -0.145*** 
  
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Black 0.02 0.261*** 0.266*** 0.266*** 0.264*** 
  
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) 
Hispanic 0.03 0.067* 0.092** 0.081** 0.092** 
  
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) 
Asian 0.01 -0.066 -0.062 -0.063 -0.063 
  
(0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) 
High school teacher 0.23 0.011 0.004 0.003 0.005 
  
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Special education teacher 0.14 -0.000 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
  
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Suburb 0.59 0.004 0.007 0.007 0.007 
  
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Rural or town 0.27 0.058*** 0.065*** 0.066*** 0.066*** 
  
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Graduate Degree 0.12 0.006 0.021 0.017 0.022 
  
(0.020) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Degree from elite IL college 0.09 -0.074*** -0.079*** -0.079*** -0.080*** 
  
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Degree from in-state 0.72 0.022 0.015 0.018 0.015 
  
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Art 0.07 -0.001 -0.004 -0.002 -0.004 
  




Table C.2: Results for linear probability model regressions, separations under age 50 
(dependent variable = decision to claim refundable contributions) (Cont.) 
  mean (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ELA 0.23 -0.016 -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 
  
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Foreign language 0.06 -0.001 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 
  
(0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
Math or Science 0.13 -0.014 -0.015 -0.014 -0.015 
  
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Social Science 0.22 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
  
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Vocational 0.02 -0.035 -0.035 -0.034 -0.036 
  
(0.039) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) 
Dist enrollment, in thousands 6.63 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Dist pupil-teacher ratio 16.22 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
  
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Dist IEP percent 0.16 0.020 0.030 0.022 0.039 
  
(0.188) (0.189) (0.189) (0.189) 
Dist FRL percent 0.32 0.038 0.045 0.039 0.047 
  
(0.049) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) 
Dist minority percent 0.29 -0.012 -0.012 -0.010 -0.014 
  
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) 
Constant 
 
0.542*** 0.431*** 0.361*** 0.446*** 
  
(0.079) (0.057) (0.056) (0.057) 
      Assumed real interest rate 
 
-- 0.04 0.04 -- 
Observations 
 
5,622 5,622 5,622 5,622 
R-squared 
 
0.049 0.042 0.041 0.043 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Sample comprises TRS 
members hired in or after 1980 who quit in or after 2002 as a full-time teacher, and separations 
up to age 50; sample excludes teachers with a Single Sum Retirement benefit, individuals 
observed teaching in the City of Chicago PSD, and Inactive teachers who moved into a 
reciprocal Illinois pension system. Pension wealth is computed in 2011 dollars and based on 4 







Table C.3: Results for logistic regressions under different interest rates, all separation ages 
(dependent variable = decision to claim refundable contributions) 
Assumed real interest rate 2% 2% 2% 6% 6% 6% 
  mean (1) (2) mean (3) (4) 
              




































































































Table C.3: Results for logistic regressions under different interest rates, all separation ages 
(dependent variable = decision to claim refundable contributions) (Cont.) 
Assumed real interest rate 2% 2% 2% 6% 6% 6% 
  mean (1) (2) mean (3) (4) 










Dist enrollment, in 








































Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Sample comprises TRS 
members hired in or after 1980 who quit in or after 2002 as a full-time teacher, and all  quit ages; 
sample excludes teachers with a Single Sum Retirement benefit, individuals observed teaching in 
the City of Chicago PSD, and Inactive teachers who moved into a reciprocal Illinois pension 
system. Pension wealth is computed in 2011 dollars and based on 4 percent real interest and 2.5 







Appendix D: Cash balance simulations compared with TRS benefits 
Figure D.1: Pension wealth, lump sum refund, and hypothetical CB benefit for Tier 1 
female teacher in Illinois TRS 
 






Figure D.2: Pension wealth, lump sum refund, and hypothetical CB benefit for Tier 2 
female teacher in Illinois TRS 
 
Note: based on author’s calculations 
 
 
